ipo TRAVELS IN 
in the provinces of Bengal, which, with China, afibrd an ample 
revenue, and a beneficial commerce, that no enemy is likely to 
deprive us of for a long period of time. But thefe fpeculations 
would all have vaniflied into air, had we retained the Cape at a 
peace, the pofTeffion of which, from its pofitlon on the globe, 
would contribute greatly to fecure our territories in Southern 
India, the danger to which is otherwife fo much to be appre- 
hended. The conqueft of Myfore has certainly contributed in 
ho fmall degree to our fecurity on the Malabar coaft ; has con- 
folidated our power in Southern India, and rendered the junc- 
tion of foreign forces with the Mahratta powers more difficult 
if not altogether impracticable. On the northern parts of this 
coaft only are we vulnerable in India by fea. 
Suppofing, however, the views of the enemy, on the Ma- 
labar coaft, to have failed, they would, at leaft, have been ena- 
bled, with the affiftance of the Dutch, to annoy and cut up our 
Indian and China trade by the multitude of cruizing veflels fent 
out from their iflands of France and Bourbon, and from the 
Cape of Good Hope. Even under every difadvantage, the 
French frigates and the neft of privateers on the Mauritius fta- 
tion did much mifchief at the commencement of the late war, 
and although they had few reinforcements from France, it re- 
quired five years, with a very adive and powerful fquadron 
from the Cape and from India, before they were all taken and 
deftroyed. What then muft have been the cafe, if, inftead of 
the Englifli pofleffing this important ftation, it had been an 
enemy's port for aflembling, refitting, and refreftiing the com- 
bined fleets of the French and Dutch ? It is unneceiTary to ob- 
ferve, 
