SOUTHERN AFRICA. 191 
ferve, that neither of thefe powers would have found much 
difficulty in reaching the Cape with fingle fliips, when we have 
an inftance of a whole fleet of Dutch (hips arriving there not- 
withftanding they were fifteen weeks on their pafTage. This 
fingle fleet, adting from the Cape, might have been produdive 
of much inconvenience, expence, and injury to England, and 
efpecially to the trade of the Eafl: India Company. Were, in- 
deed, the French and Dutch to keep up a proper naval force at 
this place, it is extremely doubtful if any of the homeward- 
bound fleets of the Eaft India Company would ever reach Eng- 
land, or if they did, it would be under an expence of convoy 
fo enormous, that the profits on the cargoes would be inade- 
quate to meet it ; but of this we fliall have occafion to fpealc 
more particularly in the next chapter. Such are the dangers 
to be apprehended in confequence of the Cape being held by an 
enemy. 
The principal difadvantages that would refult to England by 
leaving Malta in the pofl!efl[ion of France appear to be, in the 
firft place, the power it would give them of excluding our fhips 
from that port, the beft, undoubtedly, in the Mediterranean, 
and of increafing their force there to the complete deftrudtion of 
our Mediterranean trade ; and fecondly, the means it would 
afford of facilitating their views upon Egypt, by enabling them 
to throw into that country a force fufficient to renew their pro- 
jed: upon India, 
With regard to the extent and importance of the Mediter- 
ranean trade I fpeak with diffidence, but I am not apprehenfive 
of 
