SOUTHERN AFRICA. 209 
iicult, if not altogether impracticable. On the northern parts 
of this coast only are we vulnerable in India by sea. 
Supposing, however, the views of the enemy, on the Ma- 
labar coast, to have failed, they would, at least, have been 
enabled, with the assistance of the Dutch, to annoy and cut 
up our Indian and China trade by the multitude of cruizing 
vessels sent out from their islands of France and Bourbon, 
and from the Cape of Good Hope. Even under every dis- 
advantage, the French frigates and the nest of privateers on 
the Mauritius station did much mischief at the commence- 
ment of the late war, and although they had few reinforce- 
ments from France, it required five years, with a very active 
and powerful squadron from the Cape and from India, before 
they were all taken and destroyed. What then must have 
been the case, if, instead of the English possessing this im- 
portant station, it had been an enemy's port for assembling, 
refitting, and refreshing the combined fleets of the French 
and Dutch ? It is unnecessary to observe, that neither of 
these powers would have found much difficulty in reaching 
the Cape with single ships, when we have an instance of a 
whole fleet of Dutch ships arriving there notwithstanding 
they were fifteen wxeks on their passage. This single fleet, 
acting from the Cape, might have been productive of much 
inconvenience, expence, and injury to England, and espe- 
cially to the trade of the East India Company. Were, in- 
deed, the French and Dutch to keep up a proper naval force 
at this place, it is extremely doubtful if any of the homeward- 
bound fleets of the East India Company would ever reach 
England, or if they did, it would be under an expence of 
VOL. II. E E 
