' 2IO TRAVELS IN 
, convoy so enormous, that the profits on the cargoes would be 
inadequate to meet it ; but of this we shall have occasion to 
speak more particularly in the next chapter. Such are the 
dangers to be apprehended in consequence of the Cape being 
held by an enemy. 
The principal disadvantages that would result to England 
by leaving Malta in the possession of France appear to be, 
in the first place, the power it would give them of excluding 
our ships from that port, the best, undoubtedly, in the Medi- 
terranean, and of increasing their force there to the complete 
annihilation of our Mediterranean trade ; and secondly, the 
means it would afford of facilitating their views upon Egypt, 
by enabling them to throw into that country a force sufl[i- 
cient to conquer it, and probably to renew their project 
upon India. 
With regard to the extent and importance of the Mediter- 
ranean trade I speak with diffidence, but I am not appre- 
hensive of hazarding much by saying that it admits not of a 
comparison with that of India and China, though, perhaps, 
too valuable to be altogether relinquished. In this respect 
then the value of Malta is certainly less important than that 
of the Cape of Good Hope. But the second point is of a 
more serious nature. Some, however, are of opinion, that 
although the subjugation of Egypt may at any time be ac- 
complished by the French, through Malta, yet, in such an 
event, we have every reason to expect that the vigilance and 
activity of a British fleet, and the valor of British soldiers, 
might always enable us to dispute with them the passage of 
