S4 
FOREST AND_ STREAM. 
JAvG. 4, t§^. 
Snake Poison and the Plantain. 
Philadelphia, July 23.— Editor Forest and Stream: 
Just a word to enlighten Mr. C. H. Ames in regard to the 
name of the saving "weed" m answer to his query of 
"Particulars of Snake Story Wanted." I am sixty-four 
years old, and remember when a small boy of hearing my 
father relate, as testimony to the virtues of the common 
broad-leaved plantain {Flantago major) for bites of 
poisonous insects, etc., that a person once witnessed a 
conflict between a snake and a toad. On being bitten by 
the snake the toad would hop to a nearby plantain, eat 
some of the leaves, and like a little man, await another 
onset, the toad coming up each time apparently none the 
worse for the encounter. This becoming monotonous, the 
person pulled up the plantain and threw it beyond the 
toad's reach, which again being bitten and not finding the 
antidote, just went broken-hearted to the grave— and died 
tliere. Frank Robinson. 
Photographing Maine Moose. 
Andover, Me., June 23.— Editor Forest and Stream: 
I had a very exciting time getting these pictures. It was 
the first day of April, 1900; the snow was only 7 feet 
deep, and it would about half bear him up. If he hurried he 
would go down in all over, and in that way I soon 
would have him too, and he was ready for a fight. I did 
not care to get too near the old bull, for he was a bad 
looking fellow, but the cow was very easy to get up to. 
I put my hand on her several times. I could only do 
that when she was in all over. These were taken near the 
Rangeley Lakes on the railroad to Bemis. 
The bull is the one that is the furthest ofJ, standmg m 
the woods 50 feet away; the rest are of the cow 20 feet 
a^ay G. P. Thomas, Guide. 
^dtti^ ^ttd 0m 
The Lacey f Act. 
lie nuisances, and a large discretion is necessarily vested 
in the Legislature to decermme, not omy wnat tae inter- 
ests of lUe public require, but what measures are neces- 
sary for ihe protection of such interests. Lawton vs. 
Steele, 152 U. S., 133" ,.c u- *. 
And in people vs. Haynor, 149 N. Y., 200: Subject, 
however, to the limitation that the real object of the 
statute must appear upon inspection to have a reasonable 
connection witn the welfare of the public, the exerci:>e of 
the police power by the Legislature is well established 
as not in conhict with the Constitution (.citmg autlior- 
ities). When thus exercised, even if the effect is to inter- 
fere to some extent with the use of property or the pros- 
ecution of a lawful pursuit, it is not regarded as an 
appropriation of property or an encroachment upon lib- 
erty, because the preservation of order and the promo- 
tion of the general welfare, so essential to organized 
society, of necessity involves some sacrifice of natural 
right" (citiHg Phelps vs. Racey, 60 N. Y., 10, and an- 
other case). , • 1 
T'he United States Supreme Court has quoted, with 
approval the following language of Chief Justice Shaw, 
of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Common- 
wealth vs. Alger, 7 Cush., 84: "We think it a settled 
principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil 
society, that every holder of property, however absolute 
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the im- 
plied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that 
it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others 
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their prop- 
erty, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All 
property in this Commonwealth, as well that in the 
interior as that bordering on the tide water, is derived 
directly or indirectly from the Government and held sub- 
ject to those general regulations which are necessary to 
the common good and general welfare. Rights of prop- 
erty, like all other social and conventional rights, are 
subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment 
as will prevent them from being injurious, and to such 
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law 
as the Legislature, under the governing and controlling 
power vested in them by the Constitution, may ^think 
necessary and expedient." And says further: "This 
141: "Laws and ordinances relating to the comfort, 
health, convenience, good order and general welfare of 
the inhabLants are comprehensively styled 'police laws 
and regulations.' It is well settled that laws and regula- 
tions of this character, though they may disturb the en- 
joyment of individual rights, are not unconstitutional, 
though no provision is made for compen^adon for such 
disturbance. They do not appropriate private property 
for public use, but simply regulate its use and enjoy- 
ment by the owner. If he suffers injury it is either 
damnum absque injuria, or, in the theory of the law, he 
is compensated for it by sharing in the general benefits 
which the regulaaons are intended and calculated to se- 
cure. The citizen owns his property absolutely, it- is true; 
it cannot be taken from him for any private use what- 
ever without his consent, nor can it be taken for any pub- 
lice use without compensation; still he owns it subject 
to this restriction, namely, that it must be so used as 
not unreasonably to injure others, and the sovereign 
authority may by police regulation so direct the use of 
it that it shall not prove pernicious to his neighbors, or 
the citizens generally." 
And in commenting on this the Court said: ihe 
learned author in these and accompanying sentences is 
discussing the rule where legislative action operates di- 
rectly upon the property of the complainant and where 
injuries alleged to result are the direct consequence of 
legislative action. If under such circumstances the indi- 
vidual has no cause of action, a fortiori must the same^be 
true when the injuries are not direct, but consequential— 
when his property is not directly touched by the legisla- 
tive action, but is affected in only an incidental and con- 
sequential way." . , , , ' " 
The language of the Court in this case and other cases 
referred to indicates beyond a doubt that the decision of 
Judge Ross in the Marin county case, commented on in 
your issue of June 16 last, and of Judge Hanford in re 
Davenport, would not be sustained by the United States 
Supreme Court.. While in theory the police power of a 
State is limited, practically there is no limit thereto 
when exercised in the protection or preservation of game, 
save by the one rule that the purpose of the regulation 
must have some relation to the subject to be accom- 
\Concluded Jrom page 6s.J 
But there is another and equally important principle 
iavoived m this ciass of legislation, and that is that the 
States m adopting the Jbeaeral constitution retained to 
tneniseives an tue powers not expressly or by necessary 
implication granted to the Jrederal Government by that 
instrument, among the powers not granted being the r.ght 
to govern their uuernal anairs as mey mignt tnink best, 
ana one of such powers was what is usually cahed the 
police power, unaer which latter head comes the right 
to paas game laws. 
here again i must quote briefly from the Geer case : 
"Aside irom the authority of the State, derived from 
the common ownership of game and the trust for the 
benefit of its people wliich the State exercises in relation 
thereto, there is another view of the power of the State in 
regard to the property in game, which is equally con- 
clusive. The right to preserve game Hows from the un- 
doubted existence in the Siate ot a police power to that 
end, which may be none the less efficiently called into play 
because by doing so interstate commerce may be remotely 
and indirectly affected (citing authorities). Indeed, the 
source of the police power as to game birds (like those 
covered by the statute here called in question) flows from 
the duty of the State to preserve for its people a valua- 
ble food supply (citing authorities). The exercise by 
the State of such power, therefore, comes directly withm 
the principle of Plumley vs. Massachusetts, 155 U. S., 461, 
473. The power of a State to protect by adequate ponce 
regulation its people against the adulteration of articles 
of food (which was in that case maintained), although in 
doing so commerce might be remotely affected, necessar- 
ily carries with it the existence of a like power to pre- 
serve a food supply which belongs in common to all the 
people of the State, which can only become the subject 
of ownership in a qualified way, and which can never be 
the object of commerce except with the consent of the 
State and subject to the conditions which it may deem 
best to impose for the public good." 
In Phelps vs. Racey, 60 N. Y., 10, at page 14, the Court 
says: "The Legislature may pass many laws the effect 
of which may be to impair or even destroy the right of 
property. Private interest must yield to public advan- 
tage. All legislative powers not restrained by express or 
implied provisions of the Constitution may be exercised. 
The protection and preservation of game has been secured 
by law in all civilized countries and may be justified on 
many grounds, one of which is for purposes of food. 
The measures best adapted to this end are for the Legisla- 
ture to determine, and courts cannot review its discre- 
tion. If the regulations operate in any respect unjustly or 
oppressively the proper remedy must be applied by that 
body. Some of the provisions of the act in question might 
seem to one unversed in the mysteries of the subject to be 
unnecessarily stringent and severe, but we cannot say 
that those involved in this action are foreign to the objects 
sought to be attained or outside the wide discretion vested 
in the Legislature." 
And as was said by the United States Supreme Court 
in Canfield vs. United States, 167 U. S., 518: "The 
police power is not subject to any definite limitations, but 
is co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the 
safeguards of public interest." 
And by Justice Stephen J. Field, in Mobile Co, vs. 
Kimball, 102 U. S., 704, that "this Court is not a harbor 
in which can be found a refuge from ill-advised, unequal 
and oppressive State legislation"; and by the same judge 
in another case : "It is hardly necessary to say that hard- 
ship, impolicy or injustice of State laws is not neces- 
sarily an objection to their constitutional validity." 
All this must be read in connection with what is said in 
Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U. S., 391: "While this Court 
has held, notably in the cases of Davidson vs. New 
Orleans, 96 U. S., 97, and Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 
U. S., 356, that the police power cannot be put forward 
as an excuse for oppressive and unjust legislation, it may 
be lawfully resorted to for the purpose of preserving the 
' public health, safety or morals or the abatement of pub- 
SNAP SHOTS ON MAINE MOOSE. 
Photos by G. P. Thomas. 
power, legitimately exercised, can neither be limited by 
contract nor bartered awa}' by legislation. 
These declarations were made, as may be seen, in cases 
where questions of natural right and private ownership 
were involved; and the case must be much stronger in 
favor of the power of the State Legislatures, in cases in- 
volving the right to take game, when, as held in the 
Geer case and other cases cited, no natural right or pri- 
vate ownership can exist. 
A very late case in the United States Supreme Court, 
decided May 14 of the present year, L'Hote vs. New Or- 
leans, advanced sheets, No, 15, page 788, in an opinion 
by Mr. Justice Brewer, concurred in by the entire Court, 
this language was used in regard to the exercise of the 
police power : 
"It has been often said that the police power was not 
by the Federal Constitution transferred to the nation, but 
was reserved to the States, and that upon them rests the 
duty of so exercising it as to protect the public health 
and morals. While of course that power cannot be exer- 
cised by the States in any way to infringe upon the 
powers expressly granted to Congress, yet until there is 
some invasion of Congressional power or of private rights 
secured by the Constitution of the United States, the 
action of the State in this respect is beyond question 
in the courts of the nation. In Barbier vs. Connolly, 112 
U. S., 27, 31, it was said: 'But neither the amendment — 
broad and comprehensive as it is — nor any other amend- 
ment was designed to interfere with the police power to 
prescribe regulations to promote health, peace, rnorals, 
education and good order of the people.' * * * 
Whatever course of conduct the Legislature may adopt 
is in a general way conclusive upon all courts, State or 
Federal. It is hp part of the judicial function to deter- 
mine the wisdom or folly of a regulation by the legisla- 
tive body in respect to matters of a police nature. * * * 
But clearly the inquiry as to the reasonableness or pro- 
priety of the limits is a matter for legislative considera- 
tion, and cannot be the basis of judicial action. * * * 
The truth is that the exercise of the police power often 
works pecuniary injury, but the settled rule of this Court 
is that the mere fact of pecuniary injury does not war- 
rant the overthrow of legislation of a police character." 
And the Court cites with approval the following lan- 
guage from I Dillon on Municipal Corporations, section 
plished. Questions of expediency, policy or how best to 
accomplish the end in view are for tne legislative au- 
thority alone, and with these the courts have nothing 
to do. 
As to the objection to such laws that they deprive a 
person of his property without due process of law, the 
same principles apply; but it may be proper to refer to 
what was said in Dauphin vs. Key, MacArthur Rep., 203: 
"The term 'due process of law.' as employed in the Con- 
stitution, applies only to the fundamental rights referred 
to in that instrument, and are inapplicable to mere priv- 
ileges of legislative creation. As to these, the law of 
England furnished no precedent, but the law of this crea- 
tions determines the terms and conditions of their en- 
joyment and by what process they shall terminate." 
As a person has va. reality no property in game not 
subject at all times to legislative control, there is noth- 
ing of which the law can be said to deprive him. These 
laws have been frequently attacked by those opposing 
them by invoking that provision of the Constitution of 
the United States which guarantees to all persons the 
equal protection of the laws, but in no case involving the 
validity of game or fish laws (and there are several of 
these) ever coming before the United States Supreme 
Court, so far as I can discover, has that court held such 
laws invalid for that or any other reason. _ What this 
phrase means and its application and limitations are but 
illustrated by what that court said in the late case of 
Magoun vs. III. Tr, & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S., 293: 
"What satisfies this equality has not been and probably 
never can be precisely defined. Generally it has been 
said that it only requires the same means and methods to 
•be applied impartially to all the constituen'-s of each 
class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly 
upon all persons in similar circumstances. Kentucky 
Railroad Tax Laws. 115 U- S.. ?2t. It does not pro- 
hibit legislation which is limited either in the objects W 
which It is directed or by the territory within which it 
is to operate. It merely requires that all persons sub- 
jected to such legislation shall be treated aHke under like 
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges con- 
ferred and the liabilities imposed. Hayes vs. Missouri, 
120 U. S., 68. Similar citations could be multiplied. But 
what is the test of likene=s and unlikeness of circum- 
stances and conditions? These references have almost 
I 
