( m ) 
tiqul^y, sud 6tkr fames of ffiuil ail kid afida i atid tba moft 
fimpk and clear perccpdoiss will lem for a true reformatioa of Pfailo« - 
fophy* In confequeace wh^rtof-i The Author faith, th*%£ th^ fitfl 
thing which is known to uSs is the Cmfcance which we have of thmki^g^ 
or that we 1^;^/^^ that we have ^n^thmghts t which he bekiveth to be 
the moft exa£t Charsfler oC a Soul i fothatth^ fame rather ftiouldbe 
defcribed or called tpfa cogUmo^ theft res c&gltms i for this cogUam ot 
A£l oithwkjng.^ he faith, to be the fanne thiog with the e^^iftenceof the 
Soul; which cannot b^ demonflraccd to aoocherj though every ona 
by himfelf is convinced, that he thinketh^ or hach an exlfisncs. For this 
Propofitioa, eg^ cogho^ I thlnkj^ being a particular oncj is more cer» 
tain than that general mi\o\\Omne cogUans eft vel exifthi and foic tseeds 
not any farther explication, Quid fi exlflere fve cogitate. Afterwards 
jirtle, 1^ he inquireth, How this hdi of r/?/;?^/;?^ becometh tobe fo 
corAinual^ as that no fpace of tinne can interrupt the feries of thopights^ 
The caufe of which> be deriveth firil from ^od^ as the only Principk 
of all Being and then from the Nature and Elfcnce of th^ Soul^ which 
is kept by fuch a divine vertue in continHal aUivlty %. when all the varia= 
tioDS v\hich arife about the thoughts of man^ are nothing but Modifica^ 
tlons of one and the fame ElTence 5 fo that a thing that once doth realty 
exifi^ cm never be brought to wrfe//?j again 5 the death or deftru£lios 
of a thing being only abace nanne, fignifying nothing but a diffolution 
of things that formerly vvere mixed artdtyed together 5 aadbythis the 
variety of modificatlom 01 thoughts do fuppofe and require always the 
co^fclenveofthinkifig^ which is properly the Effence of the Soul, lalHng 
for ever. Artie. 14 and the following, He inquireth about the diffmncs 
oithotightSi and why one thought is to be accounted to be better than ^ino» 
tker ; Where he fhcvveth , thit the prerogative or excellency of one a- 
bove another is derived from the nobility of the objeB that is concerned 
in the thoughts : and whereas the fame cannot be multiplied, he thinks 
it evident, that ^ be whole ^;(?^»^ <?f r/j^^/ifg^ri is only a continuation o£ 
the fame fubiknce, varioufly mqdified, according to thofe things that 
are within, and withour^or aboutus. And in the fame manner as ouc 
thoughts do prove our €xlftence^{Q there are certain thoughts ^\^\{\c\i do con- 
firm that there are thing?? above «x,or more ferfeEl then we can fancy ouc 
felves to be. Amongft w «n is that thought oi idea of an hpnite Being^'N^^ 
convinceth us, that there needs muft be a ^od ; becaufe no body being 
able to give or produce that in himfelf, which is beyond his reach , this 
Idea Jf^mti doth argue fome higher Principle, of an infinite power. 
By fuch and the like Arguments after the Cartejia» way, he goes on to 
demonftrate the Proprieties and Attributes of God, till^rf/V, ip he 
comes to prove the exiftence of a fenfible hody^ for we find that to the di- 
re6lionof our Senfes we meet with fuch and fuch thoughts ^{0 that againft 
fvurwili fometimes things are prefentcd to us, which we cannot /^^?/^» 
|ut are forced to thlnkjya \ which proveth both the Unm of our Sod to 
