414 
other case, they remain immoveable; or if they make 
their appearance, it is only for form's sake, and after- 
wards return peaceably to their homes. 
If the assembling of the orta be designed to raise a 
sedition or revolt, then indeed no one is deaf to the 
call, because each is sure of victory or pillage. But 
the case is different when they are to march against a 
foreign enemy; for if the circumstances be urgent, 
the government finds it necessary to proclaim that the 
Sainjeak ScheriJ] or the standard of the Prophet, is to 
be carried to the army, in order to inflame their reli- 
gious fanaticism, which must supply the place of ho- 
nour and patriotic enthusiasm; sentiments that have 
no existence among them. 
This politic resource does not fail to produce some 
advantageous results, by attracting a greater number 
of men round this palladium, which the Mahometans 
esteem as a certain pledge of victory; but as religious 
zeal cools with time, when it is not seconded by any 
immediate and direct interest, the effects of this stra- 
tagem gradually diminish. The last time the Sainjeak 
Scherif left Constantinople, it was expected to have 
been followed by thirty or forty thousand janissaries, 
yet not more than three thousand went out. This ce- 
lebrated corps, then, is not comparable to the national 
guards of the states of Europe, nor to any corps what- 
ever that has the slightest shadow of organization or 
discipline! I can only compare it to the movement or 
to the levy en masse of a whole people. The victories 
of the janissaries in former times were owing to the 
irruption of a great body of armed men upon unarm- 
ed nations, or upon smaller numbers, as badly orga- 
nized as themselves. Now that military tactics have / 
combined the minutest means for. calculating results, 
