April 1, 1901.] THE TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURIST. 
721 
transport of his guns easier, it would also enable 
tlie French to bring a formidable army into the 
heart ot his empire at a moment's notice. So he 
hastened to modify liis concession, and refused to 
allow the railway.to have a terminus at Harrar. 
By a quibble, he fixed a place called El-Bah as the 
terminus, and gave it the name of Addis Harrar or 
iNew Han ar. It is sufficiently remote to eliminate 
danger, and at the same time sufficiently near to 
make the importation of arms very easy. For the 
commercial purposes of the raihvay, liowever, it 
will be of very little use, as the railway will not be 
able to divert the whole trade of Harrar, much of 
which will continue to follow theold caravan route; 
But even if the railway did secure the whole exist- 
ing trade of Harrar, this would not suiSce even to 
repay the expenditure. And this trade is rapidly 
fal ing away. During last year not a single 
Ab yssinian merchant, coming from the interior, 
entered the place, though previously large numbers 
were wont to do so. The reason is that all the 
big merchants have already taken the Gallabat 
route. Gallabat is on the frontier of Abyssinia and 
Egypt, and the raihvay from Khartoum will be 
brought up the Blue Nile very near to it. This 
is the natural channel for trade, which in two 
or three years will all go that way ; and, railway 
or no railway, there will only remain to Jibuti 
and Zaila the trade of the provinces of Harrar and 
Shoa. The Soudan and Khartoum railway will 
take all the trade that has hitherto been brought 
to Harrar from the interior. The Kassala-Suakim 
Railway, when finished, will also deflect much of 
the trade which has hitherto been brought to Har- 
rar. From Lake Kudo) ph to Gallabat, the trade 
will follow tlie Nile Railway and Suakim Railway 
routes. At present one corja (i.e. twenty pieces of 
American piece goods), imported vim Aden, Zaila, 
and Harrar to the Kaffa and other districts, costs 
in transport expenses alone about forty-five Maria 
Theresa dollars, while the cost of importing via 
Alexandria and the Nile Railway to the same 
district will only be twenty-five dollars. This will 
kill all Harrar trade with the interior, leaving 
only the Harrar and Shoa province trade. In two 
or three years the Harrar trade will be simply a 
local one in connection with the Harrar river and 
the Arusi country, — chiefly coft'ee. Thus the Jibuti 
Railway, if it reaches Harrar in two years, which 
is very doubtful, will get, say a quarter or a fifth 
of the total present trade. As the total 
PRESENT TRADE COULD NEVER REPAY THE SHARE- 
HOLDERS 
it is bound to be a ruinous concern. 
Knowing this, the officials of the railway have 
been content to allow the enterprise to proceed 
as slowly as possible, receiving their emoluments 
and delaying the day of reckoning as long as 
they can. In this matter they have been assisted 
considerably by circumstances. When, in Dec. 
1897, the issa tribe of Somalis realised that the 
first surveys of the railway were being made, 
and tha.t a railway would take away their only 
means of livelihood, they gave out that they would 
make forcible opposition to every step of the under- 
taking. Accordingly the interim Governor of Jibuti 
made a provisional arrangement with the Okals 
(chiefs and elders of the Issas), undertaking not to 
survey or lay down lines for more than twenty kilo- 
metres from Jibuti without further notice. This 
extraordinary arrangement was intended to secure 
protection for French caravans going to and from 
Jibuti, at any rate until it should be necessary to 
proceed beyond the 20th kilometre. The French, 
however, have never regarded treaties with natives 
as binding upon themselves ; and so soon as the 
dry season came and the Issa tribes went off with 
their flocks in search of fresh pastures, the railway 
people quietly went on with their surveys further 
inland. The natural result followed : caravans 
were attacked, and reprisals only aggravated 
matters. The authorities of the railway company 
tried to hush up every outrage and summoned a 
palaver of the chiefs of the Issas, with whom they 
concluded a fresh truce. The work of the railway 
vas to be allowed to continue slowly, the Issas un- 
dertaking not to interfere, in consideration of the 
payment of 12,000 rupees. Four thousand rupees 
were paid in the course of the year 1898, but de- 
mands for the balance were resolutely ignored, and 
the tribesmen again felt that they had been 
tricked. 
And the measures for defending the outposts of 
the company seem to have been exceedingly insuffi- 
cient. The outpost at the 62nd kilometre, for 
instance, found itself on a given day with only forty 
cartridges. After endless demands and protesta- 
tions, it succeeded in obtaining ahundred cartridges 
more from Jibuti. When on February 22nd, 1899, 
this outpost was attacked by a large band of Issas, 
the authorities need not have been surprised. Six 
Italians, one young Swiss, and two native guards 
were killed, and five Europeans were wounded, 
including aa Italian woman and her child. It is 
to be lioped that the relatives of some of the vic- 
tims will take proceedings against the company, 
whose non-payment of the 8,000 rupees due to the 
Issas was the direct cause of the attack. So far 
the only reply obtainable from the company has 
been that such attacks are to be expected in a state 
of war. The existence of a state of war upon French 
territory does not seem to .strike the directors of 
the company or the French authorities as any- 
thing extraordinary, Moreover, when the servants 
of the company were engaged, they were not 
warned of the likelihood of any danger, lest they 
should demand heavier wages in consequence. The 
only consolation offered was that energetic 
measures would be taken to ensure the se« 
curity of the works. These energetic meas- 
ures, however, consisted merely in despatching 
sixty marines to Jibuti. They landed on March 
13th, 1899, but only remained there until June 
13th. ■ The withdrawal of the garrison was due;to a 
demand made by Menelik, who threatened to 
cancel the concession for the railway if so many 
troops remained in French Somaliland. Meanwhile 
no protest is directed againt the establishment of 
an Indian garrison in British territory at Zaila. 
NOW COMES OUR OPPORTUNITY. 
The Jibuti Railway has failed as a commercial 60' 
terprise. We must prevent the French Government 
from taking it up and utilising it as a stragetic in- 
strument, if they do so, our prestige in Somaliland 
will perish, even Aden will suffer, and Jibuti maybe 
utilised against us in the Soudan as a second 
Delagoa Bay. Already the fear of this has induced 
many merchants to migrate from Zaila to Jibuti. 
There are many ways in which England might 
interfere. The moment is highly auspicious for 
buying up the shares in the railway, as those in 
the Suez Canal were bought up by Disraeli. Then 
we might negotiate with the French Government 
for the acquisition of French Somaliland by pur- 
chase or exchange. I hear that they would not be 
at all unwilling. Failing that, we ought to lose 
no time in, constructing a railway from Berb^jjj 
