to leave more copies of themselves 
within a body. Is any other explanation 
required? Orgel and Crick’s title reflects 
this reversed perspective: “Selfish 
DNA: The Ultimate Parasite.” 
I can now almost hear the disappoint- 
ment and anger of some readers: “That 
bastard Gould. He led us along for 
pages, and now he gives an explanation 
that is no explanation at all. It just plain 
happens, and that’s all there is to it. Is 
this a joke or a counsel of despair?” I 
beg to differ from this not entirely hypo- 
thetical adversary (a composite con- 
structed from several real responses 1 
have received to verbal descriptions of 
the selfish DNA hypothesis). The expla- 
nation seems hokey only in the context 
of adherence to traditional views that all 
important features must be adaptations 
and that bodies are the agent of Darwin- 
ian processes. The radical content of 
selfish DNA is not the explanation it- 
self, but the reformulated perspective 
that must be assimilated before the ex- 
planation confers any satisfaction. 
If bodies are the only “individuals” 
that count in evolution, then selfish 
DNA is unsatisfying because it does 
nothing for bodies and can only be seen 
as random with respect to bodies. But 
why should bodies occupy such a central 
and privileged position in evolutionary 
theory? To be sure, selection can only 
work on discrete individuals with inher- 
ited continuity from ancestor to descend- 
ant. But are bodies the only kind of 
legitimate individuals in biology? Might 
there not be a hierarchy of individuals, 
with legitimate categories both above 
and below bodies: genes below, species 
above. (I confess to what evolutionists 
call a “preadaptation” for favorable re- 
sponse to the selfish DNA hypothesis. I 
have long argued that species must be 
viewed as true evolutionary units and 
that macroevolutionary trends are often 
powered by a “species selection” that is 
analogous to, but not identical with, 
natural selection acting upon bodies.) 
Selfish DNA may do nothing for bodies, 
but bodies are the wrong level of analy- 
sis. From a gene’s point of view, trans- 
posable elements have developed a great 
Darwinian innovation: they have found 
a way to make more surviving copies of 
themselves (by repetition and transposi- 
tion), and this, in itself, is the evolution- 
ary summum bonum. If bodies don’t 
notice this repetition, and therefore can- 
not suppress it by dying or failing to 
reproduce, then so much the better for 
repeating genes. 
In this sense, selfish DNA is about 
the worst possible name for the phenom- 
enon, for it records the very prejudice 
that the new structure of explanation 
should be combating: the exclusive fo- 
cus on bodies as evolutionary agents. 
When we call repetitive DNA “selfish,” 
we imply that it is acting for itself when 
it should be doing something else, 
namely, helping bodies in their evolu- 
tionary struggle. Likewise, we should 
