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and often so special and technical, that it is impossible for any 
man to have a thorough and independent knowledge of all. The 
advocate has what may be called a nisi prius faculty of learning, 
on short notice, what he knew nothing of before, and then for- 
getting it when the occasion is over, in order to make room for 
new acquisitions equally temporary and transient. His great art 
consists in knowing where information is to be found, and making 
the appropriate use of it for his immediate purpose. In an ex- 
tensive practice an advocate is thus brought in contact with ques- 
tions of the most dissimilar kind — commerce, agriculture, engi- 
neering, chemistry, and many others, arising out of multifarious 
patents or contracts that become the subject of litigation. I once 
was able to illustrate this somewhat oddly to a man who knew 
many subjects and wrote many books. The late Mr MacCulloch, 
the political economist, once asked me in company whether his 
“ Commercial Dictionary,” which is a very useful book, was ever 
founded on or quoted in our courts of law ? I answered rather 
abruptly, “Never; the name of it is never heard.” He appeared 
disappointed at this, and I then added, “ But very often a case 
comes in to us at night to prepare for next day, on a subject we 
know nothing about — general or particular average, foreign ex- 
changes, or the like — upon which we go to our shelves and take 
down a Commercial dictionary, which enables us to appear at the 
bar when wanted next day with an amount of information that 
astonishes even our own clients. But we never mention the book 
from which the information is got.” This statement seemed com- 
pletely to re-establish the self-complacency of the sensitive author. 
I would say here that Lord Colonsay, from his scientific tastes 
and tendencies, was more fully and accurately grounded in many 
of these questions than the most of his brethren. And this could 
not fail both to lighten his labours and to give confidence to his 
views. 
As a judge, his judgments were models of clearness and brevity, 
and were always remarkable for an anxiety to maintain the great 
landmarks of legal principle. If he had a fault, it was one which, 
I think, in judicial business, “leans to virtue’s side.” When 
he felt that he could not be bold he was apt to be very cautious, 
and certainly was ever anxious not to decide any case but the one 
