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or forces, science may be defined to be a knowledge of these devia- 
tions from the primary laws and forces, formularized in contingent or 
derivative laws. Hence, too, the tendency of all the sciences to 
centre upon a few generalizations. It is, in fact, upon these ideas 
that the recent doctrines as to the correlations or the physical forces 
are substantially founded. 
The author having called attention to these doctrines, shows that 
the generalizations he points out extend to sociology. Social laws 
must, as to society, be logically necessary laws, for without them 
society cannot exist. If the laws be not executed, society, as held 
together by law, ceases to exist, and is resolved into its elements. 
Hence all the laws of society whatever, whether written or implied, 
are necessarily correlative with a power or force sufficient to com- 
pel men to adopt their actions to the prescribed order. In this way 
we speak of the force of opinion in reference to the unwritten 
natural laws, and of the requirements of the law, just as we speak 
of the necessary laws of nature and the inevitable laws of God. 
In determining the generalizations included in the word mind , the 
author observes that, when we speak of the law, or laws, in reference 
to the conduct of man in society, we not only have in view the fact 
that there is an order of events or actions to be followed, expressed 
in law, and a power to compel to that order, or obedience to the 
law ; but we know as a fact of experience that the order is designed 
with regard to certain ends to be obtained, as results of the order. 
And we can go a step farther, and find that the designer (or de- 
signers) either is the force necessary to compel obedience to the 
designed order, or delegates it to others. In the great uniformities 
of nature we recognise a similar cause. When we speak of the ne- 
cessary laws of those uniformities, we not only include a conception 
of the force which compels the uniformities, but we go beyond it in 
causation, and think of the something which both designed the 
order implied in the uniformities, and originated the compelling 
force. Now this is what men designate mind. It is the first cause in 
creation, as it is in man’s actions. It follows, therefore, that a true 
mental science should set forth the correlations between mind as mani- 
fested in man, and mind as manifested in creation. In addressing 
himself to this task, the author points out, by way of preliminary 
remark, that the design must be carefully distinguished from the 
designer ; and the law of design or the expression of the results of 
