LEGAL PHASES OF COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS. S3 
who had not delivered a part of their fruit. The Supreme Court 
of the United States has said : *' The contract of the agent is the 
contract of the principal and he may sue or be sued thereon, though 
not named therein." 14 In other words, the general rule appears 
to be that where a contract is entered into with an agent, the agent 
contracting in his own name, the person for whom the agent is act- 
ing, the principal, may sue the other party on the contract, and in 
turn the principal may be sued by such party; and the fact that the 
existence of the principal is known or unknown to the opposite 
party at the time the contract is made is immaterial. 15 Of course, 
as suggested above, a cooperative association could include a pro- 
vision in its contract with one with whom it was dealing that would 
control the situation. 
In connection with the general matter now under discussion it 
should be remembered that members of an association are liable to 
suit, or may sue, not because they are members of the association, 
but because they are the principals for whom the association acted. 
It will be remembered that an incorporated cooperative association 
is an artificial entity, separate and apart from its members. Xo 
case has been found where members of an association have been held 
liable for wrongful acts of negligence of an association while en- 
gaged in acting as agent for members in the transaction of certain 
business or in the doing of certain work authorized by them, but 
no reason is apparent why they could not be so held in a proper 
case. 
The true conception of this matter can be readily understood when 
one bears in mind that he is liable, as a general rule, for all acts 
of his agent while the agent is acting within the scope of his employ- 
ment. The character of the agent, whether an individual, partner- 
ship, or incorporated association, is immaterial. It is upon this theory 
that automobile owners, whether individuals or corporations, are 
held liable for injuries to others caused by the negligent driving of 
their machines by their agents or employees. It is no answer that an 
agent Avas not authorized to do the particular act which caused injury 
or loss if it was done while in the course of the business of his principal 
or employer. 
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon, in 1920, 16 the 
plaintiff was the holder of 2-i shares of capital stock of the defendant 
corporation. He entered into contract with the defendant to con- 
sign milk produced by him to parties designated by the defendant, 
and the defendant agreed to collect all moneys due him on such 
"Ford v. William, 02 F. S. 2S7. 
15 Chapman v. Java Pac. Line, 241 Fed. SoO r.nd numerous cases therein cited. 
18 Steelmau r. Oregon Dairymen's League, Inc., (Oreg.) 192 Pac. 790; see also Wash- 
ington Cooperative E. & P. Ass'n v. Taylor. (Wash.) 210 Pac. S06. 
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