48 BUIXETIN 1106, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. 
The Winsted Hosiery Co. petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the second circuit to set aside the order of the commission, and 
this was done. The Federal Trade Commission then carried the case 
by certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. That court 
found that the order of the commission was a proper one, and in up- 
holding the right of the commission to issue the order it said : 
The labels in question are literally false, and, except those which bear the 
word " merino," are palpably so. All are, as the commission found, calculated 
to deceive, and do in fact deceive, a substantial portion of the purchasing 
public. * * * The facts show that it is to the interest of the public that a 
proceeding to stop the practice be brought. And they show also that the prac- 
tice constitutes an unfair method of competition as against manufacturers of 
all-wool knit underwear and as against those manufacturers of mixed wool and 
cotton underwear who brand their product truthfully. For when misbranded 
goods attract customers by means of the fraud which they perpetrate, trade is 
diverted from the producer of truthfully marked goods. 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE— INJUNCTIONS. 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
" Specific performance may be defined as the actual accomplish- 
ment of a contract between parties bound to fulfill it, for a decree 
for specific performance is nothing more or less than means of com- 
pelling a party to do precisely what he ought to have done without 
being coerced by a court." 44 
May a cooperative association obtain specific performance of its 
contract with one of its members for the delivery of produce, is a 
question often asked. It does not permit of a yes or no answer. 
Specific performance is an equitable remedy. It is fundamental that 
no one can go into equity to secure specific performance, an injunc- 
tion, or other equitable relief, where the remedy at law is plain, ade- 
quate, and complete. In general, courts of equity will refuse to grant 
a decree for specific performance if proper compensation for the 
breach of the contract could be recovered in an action at law. In 
other words, if full and complete satisfaction could be obtained 
through the recovery of damages, a court of equity will refuse to 
decree specific performance. In the case of contracts involving per- 
sonal property which can be readily purchased in the market, a decree 
for specific performance will not, as a general rule, be granted. This 
is on the theory that the injured party could easily acquire personal 
property like that called for by the contract, and damages would 
therefore afford a complete remed} T . 
In a Federal case 45 in which specific performance of a contract for 
the delivery of oil from wells operated by defendant was decreed it 
was said : 
" 25 R. C. L. 203. 
45 Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Co., 194 Fed. 1 ; see also Amor. Smelt. & R. Co. r. Bunker 
Hill & S. Min. & Co., 248 Fed. 172. 
