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40 BULLETIN 1106, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. 
is therein made the duty of the commission, in case it believeg 
that any such association “ Restrains trade or lessens competition 
to such an extent that the price of any agricultural product is 
enhanced beyond the cost of production plus a reasonable profit,” ta 
proceed against such an association for the purpose of causing it ta 
“Cease and desist from so restraining trade and lessening com: 
petition in such article.” The Ohio statute in many particulars ig 
similar to the Capper-Volstead Act, which will be discussed later. 
SECTION 6 OF THE CLAYTON ACT. 
This section reads as follows: 
That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. 
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the exist- 
ence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted 
for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for 
profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from 
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organiza- 
tions, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations 
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
It seems to be generally agreed that this section would appear to 
prevent the dissolution of an organization of farmers which meets 
the conditions it prescribes, namely, that it is a “labor, agricultural, 
or horticultural organization ;” that it is “ instituted for the purposes 
of mutual help,” and does not have “capital stock;” and last, is not 
‘conducted for profit.” However, the few decisions of the courts 
relative to this section indicate that it does not enable them, if desired, 
to adopt methods of conducting their operations denied to other law- 
ful business organizations. In a case ** decided by the Supreme Court 
involving the legality of a secondary boycott by a labor organization 
it was said: 
As to section 6, it seems to us its principal importance in this discussion 
is for what it does not authorize and for the limit it sets to the immunity 
conferred, The section assumes the normal objects of a labor organization te 
be legitimate, and declares that nothing in the antitrust laws shall be con- 
strued to forbid the existence and operation of such organizations or to forbid 
their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and that 
such an organization shall not be held in itself—merely because of its exist- 
ence and operation—to be an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade. But there is nothing in the section to exempt such an organization or 
its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal and 
legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in | 
restraint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it be taken 
as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful 
organization to become a cloak for an iNegal combination or conspiracy in re- 
straint of trade as defined by the antitrust laws. 
8 Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; see also Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65. 
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