320 
Proceedings of the Royal Society 
which we started, so corresponding postulates for action would he 
derived from these, for in every art our code of action is the 
necessary complement of our scientific knowledge. This principle 
of practical conduct must not he mistaken for the principle last 
criticised, and which was seen to lead us into difficulties, that of 
acting upon any portion of scientific knowledge irrespective of its 
importance to society ; this proposes the adaptation of our action to 
our whole knowledge of society, and the consequent infringement 
of no axiom, and recognises the necessary imperfection of such 
action in proportion as our knowledge is incomplete. This most 
highly abstract form of practical economics is capable of develop- 
ment into detail. 
§ 30. But a higher order of considerations than the sociological 
came lately into view — the ethical. Reversing our usual order and 
beginning with the practical considerations, we recognise here as 
before a vast multiplicity of actions in course of actual performance 
in each society, termed good or bad, right or wrong, the application 
and definition of these terms differing somewhat in different 
societies and schools, custom and counsel too differing as before. 
An examination of these actions to which moral importance has 
been assigned, shows that at least many, for instance crime, 
remedial effort, &c., have already been included in our survey of 
practical economics, while a reconsideration of our economic pheno- 
mena shows that moral significance is constantly attached to 
common acts, say of commerce or husbandry. The interesting 
detailed examination of the economic aspects of actions commonly 
termed moral, and of the moral aspects of actions commonly termed 
economic, which must be left to the reader, leads to the conclusion 
that at least the majority of the actions going on in the society 
(probably indeed all) possess both aspects. Without going so far, 
if it be granted that certain practical actions have both economic 
and ethical aspects, it follows that in these given respects both 
moral and economic action must coincide. Bor if the action based 
upon economic science do not coincide with the action based upon 
ethical science (assuming such science to exist), it follows that 
the two sciences of sociology and ethics are not in unity ; and 
inversely, if this denial of the unity of science be not made, 
economic action must harmonise and coincide with moral action. 
