115 
of Edinburgh, Session 1866-67. 
justice the names of diorthotic and dianemetic justice (SUaiov 
SiopOonLKov and Slkcuov SLavcfxrjTLKov), names which the schoolmen 
and jurists rendered by justicia correctiva or commutativa, andyws- 
ticia distributiva. The object of diorthotic or corrective justice 
Aristotle explained to be, to give to each a perfectly fair, un- 
biassed, and, in that sense, equal opportunity of vindicating what- 
ever might be due to him, whether the amount was greater or 
smaller than that which was due to his neighbour. This was what 
we call equality before the law ; and justice demanded that equality, 
in this sense, should be absolute. There was to be no distinction 
whatever of rich or poor, wise or foolish, male or female, old or 
young. The object of dianemetic justice, on the other hand, was to 
ascertain how much was due to each, and to rank them accordingly. 
Here was still equality, 'perfect equality, but equality which was no 
longer absolute , but relative. It was proportioned to the facts which 
the claimants respectively established with reference to the matter 
in dispute. So far all is clear. There can be no doubt that this 
was what Aristotle meant, and as little doubt that he was right. 
As to the application of the doctrine there is great confusion in 
the text, and even Sir Alexander Grant has not made much of it. 
What it seems to indicate is, that diorthotic justice, or absolute 
equality, is applicable to private — and dianemetic justice, or relative 
equality, to public questions, and both exclusively. But this could 
scarcely have been Aristotle’s meaning. Both principles come into 
play in every department of jurisprudence, and are called into 
action in the decision of every case, from the most insignificant 
question of private right to the most momentous questions of 
national or international policy. And the method of their action 
is this : The first principle — absolute equality — governs the con- 
duct of the suit, or of the investigation, whatever form it may 
take, whether it be conducted for judicial, legislative, or social pur- 
poses. The second, relative equality, governs the decision of the 
cause, whether that decision be pronounced in a small-debt court, 
in a national legislature, in a congress of nations, or in a club of 
gossips. As an illustration of the mutual action of these principles 
in private law, take the familiar case of the distribution of a bank- 
rupt estate. One man has invested L.5 in the concern, and another 
L.50. As suitors , the law puts them on a footing of absolute equality. 
No preference is given to Jew or to Gentile, to noble or to simple, 
