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but unfortunately he has not done so ; and as his fame and position pre- 
clude our passing over the inaccuracies in his work with a brief comment 
or laying it aside altogether, we have no other alternative than to deal with 
its defects as with its merits. This we will endeavour to do as fairly as 
we are able, not confining ourselves to a mere expression of opinion as to 
what appears to us inaccurate or inconsistent, but endeavouring to point 
out where the error lies, and where the argument yields under investiga- 
tion. 
It would be almost impossible, in this criticism, to sever the author’s 
views concerning the laws of nature from those of Mr. Darwin. Not 
that we consider them identical, but the author seems to believe that they 
are, and would have us think the same ; so he has written his book 
accordingly. 
To some extent, no doubt, their views are identical, and in one important 
particular they may be considered completely to coincide. Both believe 
that the formation of a new species in nature is the result of the gradual 
modification of some other species (that each is not a special creation) ; 
and that the operating cause is the conjoint action of what the author calls 
“ atavism* and variability,” and the various conditions of existence in 
which the animals are placed ; in fact, they believe that the production of 
varieties and the perpetuation of races are due to inherent tendencies or 
properties possessed by the animals themselves, and by the external con- 
ditions by which they are surrounded ; and then extending this principle 
further, they believe in the formation, by this mode, of species , genera , &c. 
This is the doctrine of Mr. Darwin. But our author is not content to 
be a teacher, a mere repeater of the theory of another : he takes upon 
himself the duty of a guide and critic, and tells us that, before we accept 
any new theory of this kind, we ought to subject it to the most searching 
scrutiny ; thus constituting himself our guide, he proceeds to lead us 
accordingly. 
We should not, he says, reject this or any other hypothesis merely 
because we are told that it is not in accordance with the Baconian philo- 
sophy, but we should deal with it as we would treat any question in common 
life. To enable us to do this, he gives, in one portion of his work, numerous 
illustrations of the kind of treatment of which subjects of this kind are 
susceptible, selecting one example in particular that appears to him to be 
peculiarly applicable to the solution of the problem connected with the pro- 
duction of a new species ; and in a later discourse, he lays down with 
more precision the rules by which, according to his views, the accuracy 
of Mr. Darwin’s hypothesis should be tested. 
“ The method of scientific investigation,” he tells us, “ is nothing but 
the expression of the necessary mode of working of the human mind;” 
and, as an incident taken from common life, illustrative of the 
method by which phenomena may be attributed to their true causes, 
he mentions the case of a man who, having left some piate in his 
parlour over night, comes down the next morning and misses it. Seeing 
* Hereditary similitude, from atavus (ancestor). 
