146  Contemporary  Agricultural  Law. 
was  bitten  by  the  defendant’s  horse.  He  sued  the  defendant 
for  damages  for  the  injury  he  had  sustained  and  was  awarded 
lOOZ.  damages  in  the  County  Court.  On  appeal  to  the  King’s 
Bench  Division  this  decision  was  reversed,  the  Court  holding 
the  plaintiff  to  be  a trespasser,  and  laying  down  that  a tres- 
passer cannot  maintain  an  action  for  damages  sustained  while 
trespassing  in  a case  where  the  savage  animal  is  not  kept  for 
the  express  purpose  of  attacking  trespassers.  A man  has  a 
right  to  keep  a savage  animal  and  there  is  no  duty  on  him 
so  to  keep  it  as  not  to  injure  a trespasser.  This  case  has 
quite  recently  been  taken  to  the  Court  of  Appeal,  who  affirmed 
the  decision  of  the  Court  of  King’s  Bench,  holding  that  the  fact 
that  the  defendant  knew  that  the  public  habitually  crossed  this 
field  without  leave  did  not  impose  upon  him  towards  persons 
so  crossing  any  duty  not  to  keep  an  animal  such  as  the  horse 
in  question  in  the  field,  though  one  Judge  (Lord  Justice 
Buckley)  dissented  from  this  conclusion  (1910,  1 K.B.  173). 
The  result  would  of  course  have  been  different  if  there  had 
been  a right  of  way  across  the  field,  for  it  is  clear  that  a farmer 
would  have  no  right  to  turn  an  animal  known  to  be  savage 
into  a place  where  the  public  have  a right  of  passage,  and 
he  would  be  liable  if  he  did  so  for  any  resulting  injury. 
There  have  been  two  cases  of  injury  caused  to  stock.  In 
Hague  v.  Doncaster  Rural  Council  (100  L.T.,  121  ; 7 L.G.R., 
129),  a stream  was  polluted  by  effluent  from  a sewage  farm  of  a 
local  authority,  and  three  bullocks  of  the  plaintiff  died  in  con- 
sequence of  drinking  the  water.  It  was  held  that  the  local 
authority  was  liable  for  the  damage  caused  and  that  it  was  no 
defence  to  the  claim  that  the  action  was  not  brought  within 
six  months  of  the  death  of  the  bullocks,  inasmuch  as  the 
pollution  of  the  stream  commenced  some  time  back  and  was 
continued  until  the  commencement  of  the  action,  and  therefore 
there  had  been  a “ continuance  of  injury  or  damage  ” which 
enabled  the  proceedings  to  be  commenced  under  Section  1 (a) 
of  the  Public  Authorities  Protection’s  Act,  1893,  at  any  time 
within  six  months  next  after  the  ceasing  thereof.  The  action 
was  therefore  brought  in  time,  as  it  was  commenced  before  the 
act  complained  of,  f.e.,  the  pollution,  had  ceased.  Torrance  v. 
Ilford  Urban  Council  (7  L.G.R.,  60, 554 ; 99  L.T.,  847)  was  a case 
where  a horse  died  from  over-exertion  in  pulling  a waggon 
over  loose  granite  laid  5 inches  deep  on  the  whole  width  of  a 
certain  lane  for  a distance  of  40  or  50  yards.  The  waggon 
contained  a load  weighing  some  3 tons  and  was  drawn  by  two 
horses.  The  plaintiff  to  whom  the  horse  belonged  alleged 
negligence  on  the  defendant  Council’s  part  in  the  following 
respects  : (1)  that  the  highway  was  not  closed  ; (2)  that  it  was 
not  repaired  in  halves ; (3)  that  no  warning  notice  was  put  up  ; 
