128  Contemporary  Agricultural  Laic. 
right  of  way  was  not  liable  for  injuries  caused  to  the  plaintiff 
who  crossed  the  field  without  the  defendant’s  express  per- 
mission. The  plaintiff  appealed  to  the  House  of  Lords,  who 
reversed  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeal.  As  there  was 
a finding  of  the  County  Court  Judge  to  the  effect  that  the 
defendant  knew  that  the  field  was  habitually  used  by  the 
public  as  a short  cut,  although  there  may  have  been  no  right 
of  way  across  it,  and  that  the  horse  he  had  put  there  was 
ferocious,  it  was  decided  that  he  owed  a duty  to  the  public 
crossing  the  field  to  give  notice  of  probable  danger  from  the 
horse,  and  that  as  he  had  failed  to  give  such  notice  he  was 
liable  for  the  injuries  caused  to  the  plaintiff.  The  l’esult  of 
this  decision  seems  to  be  that  a burthen  is  imposed  on  a farmer 
whose  field  may  be  crossed  to  his  knowledge  by  members  of  the 
public,  though  without  any  right  of  way,  to  give  public  warning 
of  any  danger  from  any  savage  animal  he  may  place  there. 
Maclean  v.  Laidlaw  (1909,  S.C.  (J.)  68)  is  a Scottish  case 
under  the  Sheep  Scab  Order  of  1905  of  the  Board  of  Agri- 
culture and  Fisheries,  which  provides  that  “ every  person 
having  or  having  had  in  his  possession  or  under  his  charge 
a sheep  affected  with,  or  suspected  of,  sheep  scab,  shall  with 
all  practicable  speed  give  notice  of  the  fact  of  the  sheep  being 
so  affected  or  suspected,  to  a constable  of  the  police  force  for 
the  police  area  wherein  the  sheep  so  affected,  or  suspected  is 
or  was.”  It  was  held  that  in  a prosecution  for  a contravention 
of  this  provision  if  it  is  proved  that  it  was  within  the  know- 
ledge of  the  accused  that  a reasonable  suspicion  of  sheep  scab 
existed,  it  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  a conviction  to  prove 
that  the  accused  himself  shared  the  suspicion.  Whether  there 
is  or  is  not  a reasonable  suspicion  is  a question  of  fact  in  each 
case. 
The  case  of  Potter  v.  Challans  (102  L.T.,  325  ; 74  J.P.,  114) 
arose  under  the  Cruelty  to  Animals  Act,  1849.  The  respondent 
was  summoned  for  causing  a sheep  to  be  ill-treated.  Evidence 
was  given  that  a sheep  belonging  to  him  which  had  been 
attacked  by  flies  was  seen  in  one  of  his  fields,  and  two  days 
later  was  found  dead  with  a large  wound  on  the  back,  that 
it  must  have  died  from  exhaustion  owing  to  its  being  eaten  by 
maggots  and  must  have  suffered  great  pain,  and  that  the  wound 
did  not  appear  to  have  been  treated  or  dressed.  Evidence  was 
also  given  that  the  respondent  said  that  he  knew  some  of  his 
sheep  were  affected  with  fly  and  that  he  had  sent  a man  to 
dress  the  wounds.  The  Justices,  without  calling  upon  the 
respondent,  dismissed  the  summons,  being  of  opinion  that 
there  was  not  sufficient  evidence  that  the  respondent  had  un- 
lawfully and  cruelly  caused  the  sheep  to  be  ill-treated.  The 
Court  of  King’s  Bench  he'd  that  it  could  not  be  said  that  the 
