Contemporary  Agricultural  Law. 
129 
Justices  had  taken  a wrong  view  or  that  they  had  misdirected 
themselves.  The  prosecution  therefore  failed. 
The  question  of  damages  for  breach  of  a contract  for  service 
by  a stallion  was  considered  in  Sapwell  v.  Bass  (1910,  2 K.B., 
486  ; 79  L.J.K.B.,  932).  The  defendant  was  owner  of  a famous 
stallion  named  Cyllene  and  contracted  with  the  plaintiff,  who 
was  a breeder  of  racehorses,  that  Cyllene  should  during  the 
season  of  1909  serve  one  of  the  plaintiff’s  brood  mares  at  a fee 
of  300Z.  In  July,  1908,  the  defendant  sold  Cyllene  for  30,000£. 
to  go  to  South  America,  and  was  therefore  unable  to  carry  out 
his  contract.  The  defendant  proved  that  the  average  profit  he 
had  made  out  of  foals  by  Cyllene  in  previous  years  was  700 
guineas,  but  one  of  the  plaintiff’s  mares  served  by  Cyllene  in 
1908  had  proved  barren.  The  plaintiff,  in  these  circumstances, 
claimed  to  recover  damages  for  the  expected  profit  he  had  lost 
through  the  defendant's  breach  of  contract.  It  was  held  that  there 
was  no  evidence  of  any  legal  damage  suffered  from  the  breach  of 
contract,  the  damages  claimed  being  too  remote  to  be  recoverable 
as  they  depended  entirely  on  contingencies  or  chances. 
The  exemption  of  a farmer's  dog  from  the  necessity  of  a dog 
licence  Avas  dealt  with  in  Egan  v.  Floyde  (102  L.T.,  745  ; 74 
J.P.,  223  ; 8 L.G.R.,  495),  where  it  was  held  that  the  exemption 
from  duty  granted  to  the  owner  on  the  ground  that  the  dog  is 
kept  solely  for  the  purpose  of  tending  sheep  or  cattle  on  a farm 
is  not  destroyed  by  proof  of  an  isolated  instance  of  the  use  of 
the  dog  for  catching  rabbits  at  harvest  time  in  a harvest  field, 
with  the  knowledge  of  but  without  encouragement  on  the  part 
of  the  owner.  Lord  Alverstone,  however,  stated  that  if  it  were 
found  in  any  other  case  that  the  dog’s  owner  had  so  purposely 
used  the  dog  the  conclusion  of  the  Court  would  be  otherwise, 
and  it  would  certainly  be  prepared  to  hold  that  there  had  been 
evasion  of  the  terms  of  the  exemption. 
The  liability  of  a railway  company  to  maintain  sufficient 
gates  on  a level  crossing  was  considered  in  Parkinson  v.  Gar- 
slang  and  Knott  End  Railway  (1910, 1 K.B.,  615  ; 79  L.J.K.B., 
380).  The  plaintiff  owned  a horse  which,  in  consequence  of 
the  inefficiency  of  the  plaintiff’s  gates,  strayed  on  to  a public 
footpath  which  crossed  the  railway  at  a level  crossing.  He 
then  got  on  to  the  railway  through  the  gate  at  the  level  crossing, 
which  was  open  owing  to  a defect  in  the  fastening,  and  was 
killed.  It  was  held  that  Section  61  of  the  Railways  Clauses  Act, 
1845,  imposed  on  the  railway  company  an  obligation  to  erect 
and  maintain  good  and  sufficient  gates  or  stiles  where  the  rail- 
way crossed  any  footway  on  the  level  as  a duty  owed  to  all  the 
world,  and  not  merely  to  owners  and  occupiers  of  adjoining  land, 
and  they  were  therefore  liable  for  the  loss  of  the  plaintiff’s  horse. 
In  Cooker  v.  Willcocks  (27  T.L.R.,  137)  a question  as  to  the 
YOL.  71.  K 
