214 
POPULAR SCIENCE REVIEW. 
cent, of the cases the works so published are upon general Natural History. 
These statements do not apply to Great Britain alone. All over the world 
there is the same desire on the part of those who do not call themselves 
scientific to be familiar with the sublime teachings of philosophy and the won- 
derful phenomena of Nature. In France, Germany, and America the rage for 
popular books is as great, if not greater, than it is in this country. Is it to 
be believed, then, that the result of the desire and supply is injurious to the 
true interests of science ? Are we to suppose that, because the masses 
cannot follow the philosopher into the discussion of propositions which 
involve a consideration of abstract questions, therefore they cannot be 
improved by being taught the interesting facts and the grand general 
principles of science ? We think not. The arguments of those who oppose 
popular teaching beg the entire question, and their tendency and motives are 
mischievous and selfish. It is too general an impression that, because “a 
little learning is” sometimes “a dangerous thing,” it is better to have no 
knowledge at all than a superficial acquaintance with truth. Can it be 
thought, upon candid reflection, that such a theory as' this is correct ? We 
do not hold with such a creed. The terms little and much are, after all, but 
relative, and though the student of a popular treatise may learn but a little, 
his knowledge is as great in comparison with ignorance as that of the savant 
is in comparison with the knowable. Unquestionably, the little knowledge 
has led the tyro over and again into blunders and absurdities, and these 
have been detected by the philosopher. But, we would ask, does not the 
philosopher himself trip now and then, and is not his supposed freedom 
from error due to the fact that he has no one to point out his faults ? How- 
ever we may offend those who are devoted to pure science, we cannot help 
asserting our belief that a little knowledge is better than none at all. 
If the publication of popular scientific works subserves no better purpose, 
it excites a taste for scientific pursuits, and leads many to the rank of the 
philosopher who, were it not for this, would remain in the slough of 
ignorance and contentment which the adoption of the pernicious proverb we 
have cited is calculated to produce. Again we say it : a little learning is 
not a dangerous thing. People who have confined their attention to popular 
treatises on science may often be heard expressing theories, and committing 
themselves to statements, which are unsound ; but, with all the chaff of mis- 
conception which we detect in these utterances, there is the good grain of 
truth ; and who will contend against its beneficial influence ? How many of 
us, let us ask, are prepared to swear by the scientific doctrines to which we 
appear to yield so firm an allegiance ? If we were to submit our pet theories 
to a rigorous analysis, how many of them would stand ? We venture to say 
a very small proportion. Shall we, therefore, condemn popular scientific 
teaching because it is further from the truth than that which is more 
distinctly technical ? Shall we exalt our own labours to the acme of 
perfection ? Shall we, assuming an intellectual status which we have not 
justified, .look down upon our humble fellows and say, “Be profound in 
knowledge, or perish in ignorance ” ? If so, we shall be unable to defend 
ourselves from the charge of interested intolerance ; for, through a 'pretence 
as paltry as it is pitiful, we shall exclude the masses from the prosecution 
of Nature’s grandest problems. 
