MAN AND APES. 
263 
latisternal Ape, but of one much more widely differing from all 
the others than such others differ one from another amongst them- 
selves. We should be especially struck with its vast brain, and 
we should be the more impressed by it when we noted how 
bulky was the body to which that brain belonged. We should be 
so impressed because we should have previously noted that, as a 
general rule, in backboned animals,' the larger the bulk of the 
body the less the relative size of the brain. From our know- 
ledge of the habits and faculties of various animals in relation 
to their brain structure, we should be led to infer that the 
animal man was one possessing great power of co-ordinating 
movements, and that his emotional sensibility would have 
been considerable. But above all, his powers of imagination 
would have been deemed by us to have been prodigious, with a 
corresponding faculty of collecting, grouping, and preserving 
sensible images of objects in complex and coherent aggregations 
to a degree much greater than in any other animal with which 
we were before acquainted. Did we know that all the various 
other kinds of existing animals had been developed one from 
another by evolution ; did we know that the numerous species 
had been evolved from potential to actual existence by im- 
planted powers in matter, aided by the influence of incident 
forces ; then we might reasonably argue by analogy that a 
similar mode of origin had given rise to the exceptional being, 
the body of which we were examining. 
If, however, it were made clear to us — immaterial intelli- 
gences — that the dead body before us had been, in life, animated, 
not by a merely animal nature, but by an active intelligence 
like our own, so that the difference between him and all other 
animals was not a difference of degree but of kind — if we 
could be made to understand that its vast power of collecting 
and grouping sensible images served but to supply it with the 
materials made use of by its intelligence to perceive, not merely 
sensible phenomena, but also abstract qualities of objects — if 
we became aware that the sounds uttered by it in life were not 
exclusively emotional expressions, but signs of general concep- 
tions (such as predominate in the language of even the lowest 
savage), then the aspect of the question would be entirely 
altered for us. 
We should probably decide that if the body before us 
seemed to us to be so little related to the informing rational 
soul that its existence anterior to and independent of such 
rational soul was quite conceivable and possible, then its origin 
by process of natural evolution would, indeed, also be conceiv- 
able and indeed d priori probable. 
But if, on the other hand we were convinced, from whatever 
reason, that it was inconceivable and impossible for such a body 
