102 
THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY 
world, — that is, a being whose moral and intellectual powers 
are represented in the subjects of nature, the utilities and 
ends of which latter are reflected in him, and, as a final 
cause, take their rise and origin from him, in the scale of 
creation: and, judging from all that has been said upon this 
subject, there can be little doubt, that as all natural things 
are subservient as means to things moral and intellectual, 
so the former, as much as possible, would seem to be made 
the emblems and representatives in which the latter may 
be contemplated. 
I have been led to offer these remarks on the final causes 
of lower existence, because I consider that they are so con- 
nected with the question of instinct, that, taken in a gene- 
ral point of view, they help to determine what sort of 
limited and subservient powers the brute creation may be 
expected, a priori , to possess. 
The above idea it appears very necessary to keep in mind, 
to prevent us from assigning to brutes, mental attributes 
above the sphere of their common nature, and as leading 
us to investigate those causes which alone appear properly 
and rationally adequate to the production of the wonderful 
system and order observable in their actions. It is from 
failing to retain steadily in the mind’s view this necessary 
leading principle, that we are led into erroneous conclusions 
respecting the powers of the brute mind, and the operative 
means by which the actions of brutes are effected; which 
so much resemble the operations of human intellect, that as 
before observed, they may be said to represent and illus- 
trate them. 
On this account, considerable difficulty has been found in 
drawing a distinct line between the conscious discrimina- 
tive powers of brutes, and those of human rationality; and 
in affixing a true character to the mental principles in which 
the actions of the brute creation originate. 
Now it seems demonstrable that brutes are possessed of a 
limited conscious discrimination and determination; which 
discrimination and determination do not, however, embrace 
what is either moral, intellectual, or rational, as regards the 
consciousness of the creature: but as their actions involve 
in them causes or powers that are evidently of a moral, in- 
tellectual, and rational order, and which powers evidently 
act upon the mental constitution of brutes by impressing 
and guiding their conscious powers of discrimination and 
determination to action, according to the purposes or final 
causes of their being:— it may, therefore, be justly inferred 
that the Divine Energy does in reality act, not imme- 
diately , but mediately i or through the medium of moral 
and intellectual influences, upon the nature or consciousness 
of the creature, in the production of the various, and, in 
many instances, truly wonderful actions which they perform. 
If it be asked by what intermediate agency the opera- 
tions of brutes are thus directed; — I reply that it is gene- 
rally admitted, by a large class of mankind, at least, that 
superior (yet intermediate) powers of some kind, are in 
actual connexion with the human mind, — though not lead- 
ing it blindly, as might be supposed to be the case with re- 
gard to brutes; — and if this be admitted, there remains no 
reasonable ground for denying the connexion and influence 
of similar powers, (whatever they may be), operating upon 
and disposing to certain ends the conscious natures of brutes; 
which natures, if we suppose them destitute of moral and 
intellectual consciousness, have need of the operation of 
such powers to direct them. The phenomena of brute ac- 
tion, indeed, are inexplicable upon any other grounds, but 
these once admitted, there appears to be nothing in the 
whole circle of instinctive operations which may not be 
satisfactorily accounted for. I will not even venture a sug- 
gestion as to the nature of the intermediate superior powers 
here alluded to; but their agency, I repeat, is plainly mani- 
fest in the conduct of brutes. 
Viewed, then, in this light, and explained in this man- 
ner, Providence is conspicuous in the operations of brute 
nature; and it is but reasonable to conclude that the Divine 
Being does indeed operate, by unseen mediums, of what- 
ever kind they be, as the Great Regulator of the whole. 
Facts have undoubtedly occurred to exemplify the opera- 
tion of such agency in special interferences of Providence, 
through the medium of the brute mind; of which the fol- 
lowing well authenticated instance must be regarded as a 
very striking one. 
At Ditchley, near Blenheim, now the seat of Viscount 
Dillon, but formerly of the Lees, Earls of Lichfield, is a 
portrait of Sir Henry Lee, by Jansen, with that of a mas- 
tiff dog which saved his life. One of Sir Henry’s servants 
had formed the design of assassinating his master, and rob- 
bing the house; but on the night he had intended to perpe- 
trate it, the dog, for the first time, followed Sir Henry up 
stairs, took his station under his bed, and could not be 
driven thence; in the dead of the night, the servant, not 
knowing the dog was there, entered the room to execute his 
diabolical purpose; but was instantly seized by the dog, and 
being secured, confessed his intentions. In a corner of the 
picture are these lines: 
But in my dog, whereof I made no store, 
I find more love than those I trusted more. 
What an instance is this to- show the operation of a supe- 
rior moral and intellectual power disposing the inclinations 
and perceptions of an animal, for a stated end ; while the 
natural volitions of the creature, were at the same time ex- 
ercised by it in freedom towards the furtherance of this end ! 
Whether we suppose the immediate means made use of to 
impress the animal’s conscious mind, to be that of an ideal 
