104 
THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY 
fie; to which latter principles alone design can properly be 
referred. If the appearances of design in the animals be 
taken as proofs of such design being proper to them, we 
must be forced to admit that they are possessed of moral, 
intellectual and scientific reflection: but we might, upon 
this principle, argue the same thing of the plant, which, 
when placed in a cellar where but a partial light is admit- 
ted, turns itself towards the ray; namely, that as there is 
the appearance of design in the action, we must therefore 
attribute design to the subject in which we perceive its ef- 
fects, and thus elevate the vegetable to the intellectual 
sphere: and we should actually do this, did we not stop 
short to consider the adequacy of the apparent agent to the 
production of the effect, as we behold it performed. 
It becomes necessary, then, to establish a test whereby 
the operation of the moral, intellectual and scientific powers 
here alluded to, may be ascertained; and whereby the line 
of demarcation may be distinctly drawn between man and 
brute. This test, I conceive, is included in the following 
propositions; viz. 1st, That moral qualities do not become 
objective in the minds of brutes; or, that the moral actions 
which they perform are not reflected upon or contrived by 
them as such; thus that they possess no moral conscious- 
ness, and consequently that no moral design can be attribut- 
ed to them; and therefore, that so much of moral design as 
appears conspicuous in their actions must be the effect of 
moral powers or energies acting upon them in a region of 
their minds above the sphere of their proper consciousness. 
2d, That intellectual and scientific qualities do not become 
objective in the minds of brutes; or, that the intellectual and 
scientific actions which they perform, are not reflected upon 
or contrived by them as such ; thus that they possess no in- 
tellectual or scientific consciousness, and consequently that 
no intellectual or scientific design can be attributed to them: 
and therefore that so much of intellectual or scientific de- 
sign as appears conspicuous in their actions, must be the ef- 
fect of intellectual and scientific powers or energies, acting 
upon them in a region of their minds above the sphere of 
their proper consciousness. 
Admiring and respecting as I do the endeavours of all 
who are engaged in the promotion of philosophic inquiries, 
I cannot but think, that in the particular subject before us, 
too much has been done to confound the natures of man 
and brute, and to separate both from the Fountain of their 
existence. Man is what he is, and derives his superiority 
over the brute creation, from the circumstance that all 
things whatever become morally and scientifically objective 
to him; and the brute is what he is, and derives his infe- 
riority, from the total absence of this distinguished and en- 
nobling faculty. It is true that many specious arguments 
may be and have been advanced to prove that the brutes 
participate in human rationality, in kind, if not in degree; 
but the ends which their natures are evidently destined to 
fulfil, would be, one might imagine, alone sufficient to re- 
fute the supposition. F or it is but reasonable to conclude, 
that the conscious powers of the creature will be according 
to the ends of its existence ; and as these ends are in 
the brute creation neither moral nor scientific, but pure- 
ly natural , and, as regards themselves, only subser- 
vient to what is moral and scientific, it thence would follow 
that they are not possessed in themselves of any moral, in- 
tellectual, or scientific conscious powers; — and are there- 
fore merely natural agents of a secondary class, in which 
such powers are exhibited. 
I proceed to consider the first of the foregoing proposi- 
tions. When we investigate the many and surprising in- 
stances in which the operations of the brute creation imply 
moral intention, reflection, and contrivance, we are at no 
loss to account for the opinion of that class of philosophers, 
who have attributed the mental inferiority of brutes to the 
mere want of adequate bodily organs; nevertheless, the in- 
tellectual consciousness of man shrinks from the acknow- 
ledgment that in one common principle of life originate the 
actions of man and brute: and that brutes, as to their mental 
constitution, are thus, as it were, “ human imps lopt off 
from the common stock of intellect and rationality.” 
There is something which seems powerfully to oppose the 
sentiment of sharing those high endowments with crea- 
tures of so inferior a nature ; and which irresistibly leads 
us seriously to examine the arguments which may be 
offered to prove that moral and intellectual powers reign 
over the conscious perception of the brute, and guide it to 
its proper exercise of those lower faculties, which it is left 
in freedom to use. The bee, we say, is a perfect political 
moralist, with respect to its actions, which evince the strict- 
est attention to the principles of order and economy, for 
the purposes of the establishment and preservation of a 
community; yet it is totally ignorant and unconscious of 
the very principles which it is so assiduous in the practice 
of; — not a ray of moral perception or consciousness can be 
attributed to it in a proper sense; it is, on the contrary, to- 
tally destitute of the means of discerning or reflecting upon 
the nature or order of the ends it is instrumental in accom- 
plishing, through the medium of its subordinate voluntary 
perceptions and powers. — Although it is in the habit of ex- 
ercising the most accurate science and means, for the fulfil- 
ment of these ends, it yet cannot look down with an ap- 
proving or disapproving perception upon the region or 
sphere of its natural powers; it evidently has no perception 
of any moral superiority in itself over the most vulgar 
worm that crawls. But if brute creatures were capable of 
moral consciousness, they would be capable of elevation in 
