AND AMERICAN RURAL SPORTS. 
105 
the scale of being; and this little insect, the bee, judging 
from its actions, would, were it capable of that species of 
consciousness, not only rank above most of the larger classes 
of animals, but would, on the score of fidelity and integ- 
rity, put human nature to the blush. 
Were it not that much has been said in favour of the al- 
leged moral consciousness of brutes, it might perhaps be im- 
pertinent to proceed further in the endeavour to disprove it; 
but so strong are appearances in its favour, that, although 
we deny the affirmative in the abstract, by an unequivocal 
assent to the proposition, that brutes are not accountable 
beings; yet we are too ready to admit it in particular in- 
stances, in which we are wont to ascribe a moral conscious- 
ness to the particular moral action we see performed by an 
animal. There is a strong tendency to mistake the cause 
instrumental for the cause principal, in this as in other 
cases; by which we are insensibly led to assign the sum 
total of the attribute to the visible agent, without stopping 
to consider further of the matter. Thus gratitude, which 
is a moral quality in man, is thought to be moral also in the 
dog; but surely no one, upon mature consideration of the 
subject, will imagine that the dog reflects on the inclination 
or desire he feels to act in a manner which we view as grate- 
ful, and that he is pleased with the survey and reflection;— 
that the moral quality of his actions becomes objective to 
him; — and yet this is absolutely necessary in order to con- 
stitute a moral consciousness; for, to effect this, it is not 
only necessary that the action be outwardly, or in effect 
moral, but that this moral action be reflected upon as such, 
in order that its moral quality may be thus perceived and 
felt. Moral consciousness can only be produced by the 
moral quality of the action becoming objective — by its being 
reflected upon from a superior eminence, and in a superior 
light, — by a soul within and above the lower, animal, or 
natural mind. But that brutes do not possess this higher 
conscious faculty, or soul, is made evident by this; — that if 
a particular individual of a species did possess it, such indi- 
vidual would be necessarily raised by it, as to its nature, 
which does not, in any case, occur. Thus, with respect to 
the gratitude and fidelity of the dog, no greater apparent 
moral sagacity can be exercised by any animal; yet being 
totally unable to contemplate his gratitude or fidelity in the 
abstract, as objects of a superior perception and conscious- 
ness, those virtues are to him as if they existed not: — to 
man alone this moral consciousness is proper, to the animal 
it is absolutely a nonentity; he is not in the smallest degree 
more moral on account of his apparent moral qualities, for 
they are indeed only apparently his own, because they do 
not reach down, if I may be allowed the expression, to the 
seat of his proper consciousness; but consist in powers or 
energies which act above it: he possesses an apparent 
Dd 
moral sagacity, but without any moral consciousness or per- 
ception concerning it. To make this plain by an example: 
the dog, if he saves his master from drowning, or preserves 
his life in any more remarkable manner, such as that in the 
instance we have before related, reflects not upon any 
moral nobleness or disinterestedness in the action; he is not 
at all the more refined for having performed an action, 
which, morally considered, would tend to raise his nature; 
on the contrary, he lives on as before, like the rest of his 
canine brethren, in no respect more elevated in the scale 
of being; and yet it is certain that in this action his highest 
natural powers of proper volition, and mental discrimina- 
tion and comparison, which we may term moral sagacity, 
have been brought into full exercise. 
But it will, perhaps, be objected, that animals experience 
delight in the exercise of moral qualities, as such; the dog, 
for instance, in gratitude. I answer, that every animal 
must necessarily have a delight annexed to that exercise of 
its powers by which it fulfils the end of its being: and the 
dog, as the natural guardian of man, has natural inclinations 
implanted in him, for the purpose of rendering him such; 
but his delight in the exercise of the inclinations, even 
when they are directed to moral acts, is purely natural , 
and in no wise moral: for, as already observed, no one in 
this case will imagine that the dog either reflects upon his 
gratitude, or is pleased with it as a moral quality. On the 
contrary, it is plain that the animal’s delight is solely owing 
to its conscious mind being determined to the exercise of 
its natural qualities or inclinations, which are those of mo- 
rally unconscious obedience and friendship to man; this 
being the end for which he is created. 
The horse, who in his aptitude for war, discovers a 
quality necessary to render him instrumental in redress- 
ing the injuries of man, is characterised as an emulous and 
a generous animal; yet neither generosity nor emulation, 
considered as moral qualities, are objects of reflection to 
him; if they were, miserable indeed would be the fate of 
the devoted charger, whose latter existence is spent in the 
metamorphosis of a poor, patient, unpitied hack. But in 
the adorable economy of the Creator, it is provided that 
the sufferings of this noble animal shall be natural merely: 
he is incapable of being made conscious by reflection, either 
of the generosity, the emulation, or the pride, which his 
actions may have exhibited: although he has shown them 
all, they have not become objective to him, inasmuch as he 
is unfurnished with a .morally conscious soul, by which 
alone this could be effected; and it is happy for him that 
neither glory nor emulation can be attributed to him, other- 
wise than as the unconscious subject in which those high 
qualities are exhibited. 
The mutual fidelity between the sexes, observable in 
