106 
THE CABINET OE NATURAL HISTORY 
doves and other birds, forms a distinguished feature in 
moral instinct; yet. we cannot suppose that the virtue of 
chastity or of conjugal fidelity is at all intended by the crea- 
ture, or attributable to it; although its actions are precisely 
the same as if such moral end were contemplated and in- 
tended by it: the polygamous species, indeed, have a claim 
equally as good as the monogamous, to the virtue of chastity, 
as far as regards their own conscious nature. But surely 
there must be moral powers which act upon and guide the 
natures of animals in order to produce these effects, while 
the creature is accessary, in apparent freedom, and uncon- 
scious of the power thus exerted on it; the wonderful ex- 
hibition of conjugal and social affections in some species of 
marine animals, in the Trichechi Boreales, for instance, is 
altogether superior to what can be explained upon any other 
principles; they will die in protecting their mates and each 
other. In their manners they are peaceable and harmless, 
bearing the strongest attachment to each other; but when 
attacked, some will strive to overset the boat, by going be- 
neath it; others fling themselves on the rope of the hook by 
which their comrade is held, and endeavour to break it; 
while others again make efforts to wrench the instrument 
out of the body of their wounded companion: none desert 
him, but persist in their courageous efforts for his rescue, 
even to the last! Their attachment to their mates is, if 
possible, still more astonishing, and cannot be contemplated 
without exciting the most vivid sympathy and admiration. 
It is indeed the most perfect lesson of fidelity and heroic 
devotion. If in this case we could suppose the creatures 
capable of reflecting upon the nature of their actions, which 
are the evident results of a moral influence, what must we 
think of them? — or rather, what must we not think of 
them? For it is to be observed, that this conduct is adapt- 
ed to circumstances, and discovers an apparent rational 
discrimination, as well as an apparent moral conscious- 
ness, in the means employed by the creatures towards the 
accomplishment of the ends which the exigency suggests. 
The controlling energies which direct the limited con- 
scious powers of brute creatures to particular ends, are 
wonderfully displayed again in the economy of the cuckoo, 
which lays its eggs in the nest of the hedge-sparrow, and in 
those of other small birds; these birds, so far from molest- 
ing the young intruder, — who, in a singularly curious man- 
ner, expels its companions, the small birds’ progeny, from 
the nest, in order that itself may be exclusively and ade- 
quately fed by the parents, — feed and cherish it, till it ar- 
rives at nearly its full growth; that is, until it is four or 
five times the size of the foster-parents. The cuckoo, as 
if conscious that one of her overgrown nurslings would be 
quite sufficient for the hedge-sparrow or wagtail to attend 
to and provide for, although she lays several eggs, deposits 
them in as many strange nests, belonging to these little 
birds; for she never builds herself: she acts, in fact, as if 
she calculated exactly what should and what would he 
done by others, for the rearing of her progeny. Another 
very curious circumstance noticed by Dr. Jenner, in con- 
nection with his remarks on the natural history of the 
cuckoo, is the power exercised by birds, — which, he says, 
may arise from “ some hidden cause in the animal econo- 
my,” — either of retarding or of accelerating the pro- 
duction of their eggs, according to circumstances. Moral 
and intellectual design and active energy, above the con- 
scious faculties of the creature, is surely evident in all this; 
for the creature is not a mere piece of mechanism, but has 
a manifest conscious freedom in the performance of its 
peculiar natural acts; but which freedom is thus as mani- 
festly controlled by superior influences, of which it is un- 
conscious. How, otherwise, can we possibly account for 
the incessant endeavours of the young cuckoo to dislodge 
its fellow inmates of the nest, while, as yet, it has scarcely 
extricated itself from the egg: it cannot reflect upon the 
necessity of its operations, either for ultimate preservation, 
or for present convenience; yet it acts as if it did, and 
takes the most effectual means for the accomplishment of 
those ends. Will those who attribute design to such ac- 
tions, say, that the design of taking the immediate steps 
necessary for the preservation of the creature can reside 
within its own consciousness? It surely cannot. — The 
final purposes which are the primary motives of its ac- 
tions, are far above what it can either conceive or survey; 
otherwise the cuckoo must indeed be a u rara avis in ter- 
ris ,” a feathered philosopher of no mean or despicable 
talent. 
One of the strongest instances of apparent moral sa- 
gacity, is that well-known one recorded of the elephant, 
which is said to have taken place in Delhi. An elephant 
having killed his Cornac, or governor, it is related that the 
man’s wife, in despair, threw her two children before the 
animal, saying, “ Now you have destroyed their father, 
you may as well put an end to their lives and mine,” — 
upon which the animal, relenting, and taking up the big- 
gest of the children with his trunk, placed him upon his 
neck, and having thus adopted him for his Cornac, would 
never afterwards permit any other person to mount him. 
In this case we cannot suppose the animal to have reflected 
upon the deed of slaughter he had committed as wrong , 
nor upon the act of atonement or reconciliation as right, 
without making him an accountable agent; there are, how- 
ever, the strongest possible features of right and wrong, ia 
the two acts and their attendant circumstances, which must 
unquestionably belong to an agency above the proper con- 
sciousness of the creature. For we have here a case of 
