150 
THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY 
its own consciousness, and which lead it to the perform- 
ance of actions which, in effect, are moral, as considered 
objectively by the human mind. 
From a comparison of this view of the nature of the con- 
sciousness of animals with that of man, the latter agent alone 
appears capable of considering and appreciating the nature 
of his own actions, and those of the inferior creation ; he 
alone is conscious of moral, intellectual, and scientific ener- 
gies and perceptions; and being, in consequence of this 
moral and intellectual faculty, at liberty to estimate and 
direct all lower operations, is in moral and intellectual, as 
well as in natural freedom; whereas the brute is in the latter 
only. From the most dispassionate survey of brute nature, 
it does not appear that the creatures have any reflex percep- 
tion respecting the qualities of their own discernment, or of 
the moral energies, or scientific powers, which they dis- 
play: on the contrary, it appears sufficiently evident that 
with respect to any perception of their own qualities in the 
abstract, the wisest is no wiser than the dullest, and the dull- 
est is equally wise with the wisest; the most moral as little 
so as the least, and vice versa : the Peacock has no more 
perception of the pride he is famed for, than the Horse or 
the Lion have of their generosity; than the Fox has of his 
cunning, or the Tiger of his cruelty. 
From these considerations, there is in appearance the 
strongest probability that the moral world, good and evil, 
may be in action upon, although above the stream of, the 
natural world, or above the consciousness of lower exist- 
ence; and that the former may thus operate upon the latter 
as a cause upon an effect. But be this as it may, it appears 
certain, that moral qualities being objective in the mind of 
man, he alone is possessed of moral consciousness and moral 
freedom of action ; thus is an inhabitant of both the moral 
and the natural world; and that as moral qualities do not 
become objective in the minds of brutes, or as the moral 
actions which they perform are not reflected upon by them, 
as such, nor are, in any respect the effects of moral choice 
and discrimination on their parts, they are therefore not 
possessed of moral consciousness, nor of moral freedom of 
action; and thus are not inhabitants of the moral world, — 
although acted upon by it, — but of the natural world only. 
Having thus concluded my preliminary remarks on the 
moral qualities exhibited by brutes, I proceed to consider 
those which are of an intellectual and scientific character, — 
to the illustration, consequently, of the second proposition 
given in a former page. As moral perception appears to be 
excluded from the conscious sphere of the brute mind, so 
neither do brutes appear to possess any reflex power of con- 
templating the principles of intelligence and science by 
which, or rather according to which, they act. They 
appear to possess no power of taking an intellectual recog- 
nizance of this intelligence and science so remarkable in 
many of their actions; and may be considered as possessing 
only an inferior, or what may be called animal mind, capa- 
ble of being influenced or directed, but incapable of viewing 
or appreciating the powers or energies which thus influ- 
ence and direct it in the most essential of its actions. Man 
is endowed with the love of science; he, therefore, expe- 
riences a delight proper to his nature as a scientific agent, 
from the contemplation of a means which is instrumental in 
the accomplishment of an end: he is also gifted with the 
love of usefulness, and therefore receives a moral delight 
from the accomplishment of the end itself, which science is 
the means of effecting. Not so the brute : — the architectural 
contrivance and discrimination of the Beaver, which is ne- 
vertheless much inferior to that of various species of Ter- 
mites; — the surprising intelligence of the Hive-bee and 
others of the Apes; — the ingenious mechanism of the Spi- 
der: — all these determinations of instinct, which, when 
viewed in connexion with the animals in whom they are 
displayed, are so astonishing, form no objects of contem- 
plation to them, while to the human mind they are the sub- 
jects of intellectual perception and reflection, advancing in 
many instances even to sublimity. 
When we observe, in the insect world, in beings appa- 
rently the most insignificant, an intelligence the most per- 
fect, presenting the most wonderful foresight, provision, 
and design, we are led at once to the recognition of this 
intelligence, as a principle which cannot, with any degree 
of propriety, be attributed to the creature, as properly its 
own; and we perceive, that in these instances, thus to attri- 
bute it to those humble animals, would be to raise them to 
an eminence far above the most sagacious quadrupeds. 
Innumerable are the instances among insects, in which 
the agency of intellectual and scientific powers, altogether 
superior to the proper consciousness of the creatures is to 
be observed; and it may be remarked, that as we descend 
in the scale of sentient being, this intellectual agency ap- 
pears to develop itself in a manner proportionably more 
wonderful; so as to afford the most substantial evidences of 
the reality of its existence and operation. 
That Bees exercise the principles of a science, of which 
they are wholly unconscious, is beautifully exemplified in 
the construction of their cells; the general form of these, it 
is well known, is that which includes a greater space than 
any other which could be given to them, without leaving a 
void space between the contiguous cells; each of which, 
from this circumstance, supplies one of the walls of each of 
the six cells which surround it. But “ it is to be remarked, 
that though the general form of the cells is hexagonal, that 
of those first begun is pentagonal, the side next the top of 
the hive, and by which the comb is attached, being much 
broader than the rest; whence the comb is more strongly 
united to the hive than if these cells were of the ordinary 
