154 
THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY 
do not carry an immediate regard to the subsistence of her- 
self or her species, she is a very idiot.” 
A similar incongruity, incompatible with the rational ex- 
ercise of the intellectual principle of foresight, upon the 
supposition of that principle being proper to the mind of 
the creature, is exhibited by the Hamster Rat, ( Mus Cri- 
cetus.) The principle of foresight, as exhibited in this 
animal, who lays up food, u not for his winter’s support, 
(since during that season he always sleeps,) but for his nour- 
ishment previously to the commencement, and after the 
conclusion of his state of torpidity,” cannot be considered 
as a principle of which he has any consciousness whatever; 
for had the Hamster a conscious perception and apprecia- 
tion of such a principle, he would be led to apply it in other 
cases, as well as in that of storing up food for the preserva- 
tion of his life; but as if to demonstrate the irrationality of 
the animal, he attacks, with blind fury, the largest quadru- 
ped that comes in his way; instead of seeking safety by 
flight, like most other creatures in whom the principle of 
caution is observable; and which a rational foresight would 
necessarily impel him to, when menaced with destruction 
by a gigantic adversary. 
The Arctic Fox, as Crantz relates, enters the water and 
splashes with his foot to bring up the fish, which he then 
seizes; and the Greenland women, profiting by his example, 
employ with success a similar artifice: the Fox surely does 
not reflect either upon the act or the means, as the women 
must do; in him the act is evidently spontaneous, and does 
not flow from any thought, of which analysis is predicable. 
The limitation of the brute mind, and its exclusion from 
intellectual consciousness, or proper reflection, is also appa- 
rent in the inutility of speech to such animals as can be 
taught to articulate, in effecting anything beyond imitation; 
evincing, clearly, the incommunicability of the power of 
reason to the creature; — while, at the same time, it illus- 
trates the power of the influence of the human mind, as 
exerted upon the mind and faculties of the animal, and ascer- 
tains the limit of that influence. There can be no reason- 
ing without reflection, no reflection without intellectual 
freedom: if this reflection and this freedom were the attri- 
bute of the brute, — how, I ask, should we deny him a share 
of human consciousness. Does this consciousness, in kind, 
exist in the brute mind? and are they endowed with it for 
no other purpose than to produce, — what it could not fail to 
produce, — the sensible perception of their own individual 
degradation ? — or, would it not follow, upon such an admis- 
sion of the rationality of brutes, that we should be very 
likely to see the fable realized of the Mice holding a coun- 
cil to “ bell the Cat,” and absolutely devising a successful 
stratagem to effect their purpose? Is there, upon such a 
principle, any ground for asserting, that, with proper care, 
we might not be able to rear a few four-legged philosophers 
and mechanicians, of at least tolerable erudition and science? 
or rather, the principle being admitted, can it be safely de- 
nied that they do not already exist? 
I am aware that there is a class of actions which are, in 
great measure, modifications arising from the influence of 
education and habit, and which, perhaps, appear more 
strongly than any others, to favour the supposition that 
brutes are possessed, in some degree, of the power of analy- 
sis and reason; but as this appearance is of so prominent a 
character, and is so closely allied to their specific mental 
capabilities, I purpose to enter upon a more particular con- 
sideration of it in the course of these essays. I shall only 
remark, for the present, that the natures of brutes no doubt 
evince a strong susceptibility of being influenced, within cer- 
tain limits, by the human mind; but this susceptibility of 
subservience to human intelligence, so far from militating 
against the views here offered of the proper naturaof brutes, 
appears rather to strengthen and confirm the position, that 
they are affected by influences above their own conscious- 
ness; and that the wisdom of the Creator has so constituted 
their natures, as to be affected by the influence of mediate 
agencies, in order to the production of the various ends which 
it may be necessary should be accomplished through their 
instrumentality. 
I need scarcely remark that the general views attempted 
to be established by the foregoing observations, cannot be 
adequately illustrated in the limited survey of a Preliminary 
Essay: — their further development must rest upon a more 
extended examination of the particular functions, which, 
taken collectively, form the brute economy. Certain it is, 
however, that the liberty and freedom of the human mind 
forms the basis of its rationality and intelligence, which is * 
no doubt aided by an influent light and perception received 
from the source of all Being; the consciousness of which 
influence connects him more immediately with that Source; 
— and that the absence of freedom in the brute mind, in 
this respect forms the basis of its irrationality, and demon- 
strates that the influent light and perception which gives 
birth to the surprising actions we see animals perform, forms 
no part of their conscious nature. Thus brutes are evidently 
connected with the Author of Creation, though in a manner 
more remote than man. 
The freedom of man consists in his being able to take a 
survey from an eminence, as it were, of the various discri- 
minations which he himself effects, and which, by various 
agencies, are effected throughout lower existence; hence, 
although man possesses a lower or animal mind, similar, as 
considered distinctly and by itself, to the brute mind, and 
which inferior mind or region he looks down upon from an 
intellectual eminence, it is evident that his consciousness 
respecting even the things of this inferior region is illumin- 
ed, by the glorious light of intellect and rationality which 
