70 
THE DESCENT OF MAN. 
Part I. 
CHAPTER III. 
Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the 
Lower Animals — continued . 
The moral sense —Fundamental proposition — The qualities of social 
animals — Origin of sociability — Struggle between opposed in- 
stincts — Man a social animal — The more enduring social instincts 
conquer other less persistent instincts — ■ The social virtues alonb 
regarded by savages The self-regarding virtues acquired at a 
later stage of development — The importance of the judgment 
of the members of the same community on conduct — Trans- 
mission of moral tendencies — Summary. 
I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers 1 
who maintain that of all the differences between man 
and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience 
is by far the most important. This sense, as Mack- 
intosh 2 remarks, “has a rightful supremacy over every 
“ other principle of human action ; ” it is summed up 
in that short but imperious word ought , so full of high 
significance. It is the most noble of all the attributes 
of man, leading him without a moment’s hesitation 
to risk his life for that of a fellow- creature ; or after 
due deliberation, impelled simply by the deep feeling 
of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause. 
Immanuel Kant exclaims, “ Duty ! Wondrous thought, 
“ that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor 
“ by any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked 
“ law in the soul, and so extorting for thyself always 
1 See, for instance, on this subject, Quatrefages, ‘ Unite de 1’Espece 
Humaine,’ 1861, p. 21, &c. 
2 i Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy,’ 1837, p. 231, &c. 
