Chap. III. 
MORAL SENSE. 
71 
“ reverence, if not always obedience ; before whom all 
“ appetites are dumb, however secretly they rebel ; 
“ whence thy original ?” 3 
This great question has been discussed by many 
writers 4 of consummate ability ; and my sole excuse 
for touching on it is the impossibility of here passing 
it over, and because, as far as I know, no one has ap- 
proached it exclusively from the side of natural history. 
The investigation possesses, also, some independent in- 
terest, as an attempt to see how far the study of the 
lower animals can throw light on one of the highest 
psychical faculties of man. 
The following proposition seems to me in a high 
degree probable — Lamely, that any animal whatever, 
endowed with well-marked social instincts , 5 would inevi- 
tably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as 
3 4 Metaphysics of Ethics,’ translated by J. W. Semple, Edinburgh, 
1836, p. 136. 
4 Mr. Bain gives a list (‘ Mental and Moral Science,’ 1868, p. 543- 
725) of twenty-six British authors who have written on this subject, 
.and whose names are familiar to every reader ; to these, Mr. Bain’s own 
■name, and those of Mr. Lecky, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, and Sir J. 
Lubbock, as well as of others, may be added. 
5 Sir B. Brodie, after observing that man is a social animal (‘ Psy- 
chological Enquiries,’ 1854, p. 192), asks the pregnant question, 
“ ought not this to settle the disputed question as to the existence of a 
“ moral sense ?” Similar ideas have probably occurred to many persons, 
as they did long ago to Marcus Aurelius. Mr. J. S. Mill speaks, in 
his celebrated work, ‘ Utilitarianism,’ (1864, p. 46), of the social feelings 
as a “powerful natural sentiment,” and as “the natural basis of 
“ sentiment for utilitarian morality ; ” but on the previous page he 
says, “ if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but 
“ acquired, they are not for that reason less natural.” It is with hesita- 
tion that I venture to differ from so profound a thinker, but it can 
hardly be disputed that the social feelings are instinctive or innate 
in the lower animals; and why should they not be so in man? 
Mr. Bain (see, for instance, ‘ The Emotions and the Will,’ 1865, p. 481) 
and others believe that the moral sense is acquired by each individual 
during his lifetime. On the general theory of evolution this is at 
least extremely improbable. 
