86 
THE DESCENT OF MAN. 
Part L 
scale are guided almost exclusively, and those which 
stand higher in the scale are largely guided, in the aid 
which they give to the members of the same community, 
Tby special instincts ; but they are likewise in part im- 
pelled by mutual love and sympathy, assisted appa- 
rently by some amount of reason. Although man, as just 
remarked, has no special instincts to tell him how to aid 
his fellow-men, he still has the impulse, and with his 
improved intellectual faculties would naturally be much 
guided in this respect by reason and experience. In- 
stinctive sympathy would, also, cause him to value highly 
the approbation of his fellow-men ; for, as Mr. Bain has 
clearly shewn , 20 the love of praise and the strong feeling 
of glory, and the still stronger horror of scorn and in- 
famy, “ are due to the workings of sympathy.” Conse- 
quently man would be greatly influenced by the wishes, 
approbation, and blame of his fellow-men, as expressed 
by their gestures and language. Thus the social in- 
stincts, which must have been acquired by man in a 
very rude state, and probably even by his early ape-like 
progenitors, still give the impulse to many of his best 
actions ; but his actions are largely determined by the 
expressed wishes and judgment of his fellow-men, and 
unfortunately still oftener by his own strong, selfish 
desires. But as the feelings of love and sympathy and 
the power of self-command become strengthened by 
habit, and as the power of reasoning becomes clearer so 
that man can appreciate the justice of the judgments of 
his fellow-men, he will feel himself impelled, independ- 
ently of any pleasure or pain felt at the moment, to 
certain lines of conduct. He may then say, I am the 
supreme judge of my own conduct, and in the words of 
Kant, I will not in my own person violate the dignity 
of humanity. 
20 ‘ Mental and Moral Science/ 1868, p. 254. 
