MORAL SENSE. 
89 
'Chap. III. 
this capacity; therefore when a monkey faces danger 
to rescue its comrade, or takes charge of an orphan- 
monkey, we do not call its conduct moral. But in the 
case of man, who alone can with certainty be ranked as 
a moral being, actions of a certain class are called moral, 
whether performed deliberately after a struggle with 
opposing motives, or from the effects of slowly-gained 
habit, or impulsively through instinct. 
But to return to our more immediate subject ; al- 
though some instincts are more powerful than others, 
thus leading to corresponding actions, yet it cannot 
be maintained that the social instincts are ordinarily 
stronger in man, or have become stronger through 
long-continued habit, than the instincts, for instance, 
of self-preservation, hunger, lust, vengeance, &c. Why 
then does man regret, even though he may endeavour 
to banish any such regret, that he has followed the 
one natural impulse, rather than the other; and why 
does he further feel that he ought to regret his conduct ? 
Man in this respect differs profoundly from the lower 
animals. Nevertheless we can, I think, see with some 
degree of clearness the reason of this difference. 
Man, from the activity of his mental faculties, cannot 
avoid reflection: past impressions and images are in- 
cessantly passing through his mind with distinctness. 
Now with those animals which live permanently in a 
body, the social instincts are ever present and per- 
sistent. Such animals are always ready to utter the 
danger-signal, to defend the community, and to give 
aid to their fellows in accordance with their habits; 
they feel at all times, without the stimulus of any 
special passion or desire, some degree of love and 
sympathy for them ; they are unhappy if long separated 
from them, and always happy to be in their company. 
So it is with ourselves. A man who possessed no trace 
