Chap. III. 
MORAL SENSE. 
93 
with his social instincts, that is with the good of others ; 
but in order to be quite free from self-reproach, or at 
least of anxiety, it is almost necessary for him to avoid 
the disapprobation, whether reasonable or not, of his 
fellow men. Nor must he break through the fixed habits 
of his life, especially if these are supported by reason ; 
for if he does, he will assuredly feel dissatisfaction. 
He must likewise avoid the reprobation of the one 
God or gods, in whom according to his knowledge or 
superstition he may believe ; but in this case the addi- 
tional fear of divine punishment often supervenes. 
The strictly Social Virtues at first alone regarded . — 
The above view of the first origin and nature of the moral 
sense, which tells us what we ought to do, and of 
the conscience which reproves us if we disobey it, 
accords well with what we see of the early and un- 
developed condition of this faculty in mankind. The 
virtues which must be practised, at least generally, by 
rude men, so that they may associate in a body, are 
those which are still recognised as the most important. 
But they are practised almost exclusively in relation to 
the men of the same tribe ; and their opposites are not 
regarded as crimes in relation to the men of other tribes. 
No tribe could hold together if murder, robbery, trea- 
chery, &c., were common; consequently such crimes* 
within the limits of the same tribe “are branded 
“with everlasting infamy ;” 23 but excite no such senti- 
ment beyond these limits. A North- American Indian 
is well pleased with himself, and is honoured by others, 
when he scalps, a man of another tribe; and a Dyak 
23 See an able article in tlie ‘ North British Review,’ 1867, p. 395. 
See also Mr. W. Bagehot’s articles on the;. Importance of Obedience 
and Coherence to Primitive Man, in the 4 Fortnightly Review,’ 1867, 
p. 529, and 1868, p. 457, &c. 
