THE DESCENT OF MAN. 
Part I- 
fundamentally identical with the social instincts; and 
in the case of the lower animals it would be absurd to 
speak of these instincts as having been developed from 
selfishness* or for the happiness of the community. 
They have* however, certainly been developed for the 
general good of the community. The term, general 
good, may be defined as the means by which the great- 
est possible number of individuals can be reared in 
full vigour and health, with all their faculties perfect, 
under the conditions to which they are exposed. As 
the social instincts both of man and the lower animals 
have no doubt been developed by the same steps, it 
would be advisable, if found practicable, to use the 
same definition in both cases, and to take as the test 
of morality, the general good or welfare of the com- 
munity, rather than the general happiness ; but this 
definition would perhaps require some limitation on 
account of political ethics. 
When a man risks his life to save that of a fellow- 
creature, it seems more appropriate to say that he acts 
for the general good or welfare, rather than for the 
general happiness of mankind. No doubt the welfare 
and the happiness of the individual usually coincide; 
and a contented, happy tribe will flourish better than 
one that is discontented and unhappy. We have seen 
that at an early period in the history of man, the ex- 
pressed wishes of the community will have naturally 
influenced to a large extent the conduct of each mem- 
ber ; and as all wish for happiness, the “ greatest happi- 
ness principle” will have become a most important 
secondary guide and object ; the social instincts, includ- 
ing sympathy, always serving as the primary impulse 
and guide. Thus the reproach of laying the foundation 
of the most noble part of our nature in the base prin- 
ciple of selfishness is removed ; unless indeed the satis- 
