100 
THE DESCENT OF MAN. 
Part I. 
quarters of tlie world, so deeply impressed on the mind 
of men ; but it is worthy of remark that a belief con- 
stantly inculcated during the early years of life, whilst 
the brain is impressible, appears to acquire almost the 
nature of an instinct ; and the very essence of an in- 
stinct is that it is followed independently of reason. 
Neither can w 7 e say why certain admirable virtues, such 
as the love of truth, are much more highly appre- 
ciated by some savage tribes than by others ; 33 nor, 
again, why similar differences prevail even amongst 
civilised nations. Knowing how firmly fixed many 
strange customs and superstitions have become, we 
need feel no surprise that the self-regarding virtues 
should now T appear to us so natural, supported as they 
are by reason, as to be thought innate, although they 
were not valued by man in his early condition. 
Notwithstanding many sources of doubt, man can 
generally and readily distinguish between the higher 
and lower moral rules. The higher are founded on the 
social instincts, and relate to the welfare of others. 
They are supported by the approbation of our fellow- 
men and by reason. The lower rules, though some of 
them when implying self-sacrifice hardly deserve to be 
called lower, relate chiefly to self, and' owe their origin 
to public opinion, when matured by experience and 
cultivated ; for they are not practised by rude tribes. 
As man advances in civilisation, and small tribes 
are united into larger communities, the simplest reason 
would tell each individual that he ought to extend his 
social instincts and sympathies to all the members of 
the same nation, though personally unknown to him. 
This point being once reached, there is only an arti- 
33 Good instances are given by Mr. Wallace in ‘ Scientific Opinion,’ 
Sept. 15, 1869 ; and more fully in liis c Contributions to the Theory of 
Natural Selection,’ 1870, p. 353. 
