104 . THE DESCENT OF MAN. Part I. 
between the various instincts of the lower animals, it is 
not surprising that there should be a struggle in man 
between his social instincts, with their derived virtues, 
and his lower, though at the moment, stronger impulses 
or desires. This, as Mr. Galton 38 has remarked, is all 
the less surprising, as man has emerged from a state of 
barbarism within a comparatively recent period. After 
having yielded to some temptation we feel a sense of 
dissatisfaction, analogous to that felt from other un- 
satisfied instincts, called in this case conscience ; for we 
cannot prevent past images and impressions continually 
passing through our minds, and these in their weakened 
state we compare with the ever-present social instincts, 
or with habits gained in early youth and strengthened 
during our whole lives, perhaps inherited, so that they 
are at last rendered almost as strong as instincts. 
Looking to future generations, there is no cause to fear 
that the social instincts will grow weaker, and we may 
expect that virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming 
perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle 
between our higher and lower impulses will be less 
severe, and virtue will be triumphant. 
Summary of the tivo last Chapters . — There can be no 
doubt that the difference between the mind of the lowest 
man and that of the highest animal is immense. An 
anthropomorphous ape, if he could take a dispassionate 
view of his own case, would admit that though he could 
form an artful plan to plunder a garden — though he 
could use stones for fighting or for breaking open nuts, 
effect. Mr. Lecky (‘ Hist, of Morals,’ vol. i. p. 143) seems to a certain 
extent to coincide. 
38 See his remarkable work on 4 Hereditary Genius,’ 1869, p. 349. 
The Duke of Argyll (‘Primeval Man,’ 1869, p. 188) has some good 
remarks on the contest in man’s nature between right and wrong. 
