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GENERAL SUMMARY 
Part 
his past and future actions and motives, — of approving 
of some and disapproving of others ; and the fact that 
man is the one being who Avith certainty can be thus 
designated makes the greatest of all distinctions be- 
tween him and the lower animals. But in our third 
chapter I have endeavoured to shew that the moral 
sense follows, firstly, from the enduring and always 
present nature of the social instincts, in which respect 
man agrees with the lower animals ; and secondly, from 
his mental faculties being highly active and his impres- 
sions of past events extremely vivid, in which respects 
he differs from the lower animals. Owing to this con- 
dition of mind, man cannot avoid looking backwards and 
comparing the impressions of past events and actions. 
He also continually looks forward. Hence after some 
temporary desire or passion has mastered his social in- 
stincts, he will reflect and compare the now weakened 
impression of such past impulses, with the ever present 
social instinct ; and he will then feel that sense of dis- 
satisfaction which all unsatisfied instincts leave behind 
them. Consequently he resolves to act differently for 
the future — and this is conscience. Any instinct which 
is permanently stronger or more enduring than another, 
gives rise to a feeling which we express by saying that 
it ought to be obeyed. A pointer dog, if able to reflect 
on his past conduct, would say to himself, I ought (as 
indeed we say of him) to have pointed at that hare 
and not have yielded to the passing temptation of 
hunting it. 
Social animals are partly impelled by a wish to aid 
the members of the same community in a general 
manner, but more commonly to perform certain definite 
actions. Man is impelled by the same general wish to 
aid his fellows, but has few or no special instincts. 
He differs also from the lower animals in being able 
