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Some commentators have suggested that the Draft EIS was deficient 
in not considering the alternative of placing all recombinant DNA molecule 
research under government monopoly [14, 32]. These suggestions are 
amorphous and lacking in detail. Such a regime would presumably involve 
a prohibition of any such research except by the Federal agency to 
which the monopoly is entrusted. It is not clear whether the commentators 
contemplate that private individuals might perform such research as 
contractors or grantees of the agency and, if so, whether the research 
activities could be performed in private facilities. Suggestions of 
this kind go far beyond the limited scope of the Guidelines to which 
the Draft EIS is directed and raise fundamental and extremely broad 
policy issues. In any event, the NIH is not aware of any facts or 
circumstances at the present time that would warrant consideration 
of so extreme an alternative. On the other hand, the NIH and the 
Interagency Committee intend to monitor developments closely, in order 
that full consideration may be given to all appropriate alternatives 
in the light of new knowledge that may emerge from scientific research. 
It has also been suggested that the EIS should consider the alternative 
of placing all recombinant DNA molecule research under an international 
agency [14, 32], NIH is not aware of any meaningful precedent for such 
an action. The practical and political difficulties in bringing about 
such a structure are so great, and its creation necessarily lies so 
far in the future, that this possibility does not warrant serious consid- 
eration as an alternative to the Guidelines. 
A number of commentators were also concerned about regulation 
of this research outside the United States [23, 32]. Over the past 
several months, the NIH has maintained close liaison with govern- 
mental and nongovernmental organizations abroad involved in activities 
relevant to the conduct and control of recombinant DNA research. 
The NIH is committed to the promulgation of safety measures for 
all such research nationally and internationally, and will cooperate 
fully with all research and regulatory efforts in this regard. Further, 
the representative on the Interagency Committee from the United 
States Arms Control Disarmament Agency has reaffirmed that the 
use of recombinant DNA molecules for biological warfare is prohibited 
by the Biological Weapons Convention. As noted previously, a statement 
on this subject by Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr., has been included 
in Section IV-C-4 of the EIS. 
An ongoing review of international activities by the Interagency 
Committee on Recombinant DNA Research, reporting to the Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, will help to determine what steps 
may be warranted by the Government to ensure effective coordination 
for international safety practices and procedures to govern recombinant 
DNA activities throughout the world. 
