Lapp^ 
- 4 - 
scale (greater than 10 liter) production of recombinant micro- 
organisms limits their use (under federal aegis) for the production 
of vat-quant It les of Insulin, factor VIII (for treating hemophilia) 
or human growth hormone. 
Protection for permissible experiments Is achieved by 
simultaneous use of biological and physical mechanisms for at- 
tenuating risk. Genetically crippled potential hosts and physical 
containment facilities are proposed for experimentation Involving 
different forms of recombinant DNA. In the guidelines themselves, 
these procedures appear extremely well thought out. 
But a sense of urgency to "get on with It" colors the tone 
of the Impact statement. In It, a strong sense of advocacy conflicts 
sharply with the otlierwlse objective tone of the guidelines. 
In the Impact statement, three critical arguments undergird 
the reasoning behind the strong advocacy towards proceeding with 
research: 1) any possible hazard of such research Is purely specu- 
lative (reiterated at least three times); 2) extrapolation from our 
existing knowledge base strongly suggests that the process of creating 
•uch organisms will In fact lead to diminished viability and risk; 
3) Che potential gains are enormous. The casual reader Is readily 
led Into a sense of comfort at the extraordinary ends to which the 
researchers have apparently gone to ensure that the genetically 
engineered bacteria and their associated plasmids will be rendered 
genetic cripples. Incapable of surviving outside of the laboratory. 
Appendix K--13 
