20 
in the loss of tine or materials, or invalidates an experiment, 
the lack of perfection is tolerable. But when there are poten- 
tially grave global consequences of even one error, then there 
are grounds for concern. The impact statement makes no attempt 
to assess the "impact" of human and mechanical failing with 
respect to recombinant DNA research under the NIH Guidelines. 
Among the difficulties is the fact that potentially hazard- 
ous biological materials or infectious agents are insidious. 
Their presence is kno\%Ti only by the proper label and a thorough 
knowledge of v;hat has taken place in a laboratory. There is no 
impingeirient of any such agents upon any of the five senses. 
Hence, as with other invisible, silent and odorless hazards, 
it is easy for personnel to underestimate the importance of 
careful handling of such material. 
Our experience with the use of radioactive materials in 
the laboratory, a situation supposedly under strict government 
regulation, shows us how many abuses occur due to the lack of 
thorough training in safety procedures or a lack of understanding 
of the nature of the hazard by personnel at all levels. Any 
realistic assessment of the causes of unnecessary^ radiation 
exposure in the laboratory must recognize the encouragement of 
carelessness because hazardous radioactive materials do not 
make their presence known. 
But the situation is somewhat different in the case of 
organism.s containing recombinant DNA. One error allowing the 
Appendix K — 74 
