- A - 
It is especially important to note that radioisotope contamination can be 
monitored, while escape and recombination of a vector will be difficult or 
impossible to detect. The importance of this difference cannot be underesti- 
mated. It is to be expected that the ratio of undetected violations will be 
infinitely higher for recombinant DNA research than for radioisotope handling. 
In summary, I believe that the containment regulations and rules outlined 
are necessary and commendable, if only to continually emphasize the danger of 
the materials involved to the scientists working with them, but I expect only 
a slight increase in safety therefrom. 
V. Recommendations 
I believe that safety lies only in totally safe vectors, l.e. , those with 
no chance of transferring or in any way permitting existence of their recombi- 
nant DNA molecule outside the laboratory. While no vector totally safe may 
exist on this planet, I feel it is completely unreasonable and unacceptable to 
use a common human saprophyte/parasite and viruses of possible mammalian onco- 
genic potential as vectors. I am well aware that the question has been con- 
sidered before by the Recombinant Advisory Committee. Indeed, the Guidelines 
show ambiguity on this question, because it is stated (p38A35) that: 
"Theoretically, the most desirable bacterial recipient of 
recombinant DNA would be a species uniquely adapted to carefully 
controlled laboratory environments and unable to survive or trans- 
mit DNA to other organisms in any natural environment. This means 
that the bacteria should be unable to survive in normal ecological 
niches, either in the laboratory or neighboring areas. It should 
be unable to colonize or survive in or on other living things, or 
in soil or water." 
However, a paragraph later, it is said that: 
"At present, no other bacterial species is known to approximate 
the definition as closely as ^ coll K-12 and its derivatives." 
These two statements are completely contradictory. The only reason that ^ coli 
is being used is that there is a vast body of information on its genetics and 
physiology available, matched by no other organism. 
I do not believe this reason is sufficient, given the potentially high 
stakes. I am well aware of the fervor and excitement with which scientists 
contemplate the experiments possible with recombinant DNA, and the degree to 
which they were chafing at the bit during the moratorium on such research. Al- 
though it would mean an additional moratorium, I believe that before continuing 
recombinant DNA research, we must develop comparable genetic and physiological 
information for a different organism, one selected to have minimal genetic 
relatedness to human saprophyte/parasite bacteria and whose whole physiology 
(rather than several mutations) would be inimical to existence outside the 
laboratory (e.g. , an extreme thermophlle) . While it took 30 years of pains- 
taking research to develop coli to the well-understood system it now 
Appendix K — 122 
