recombinant microbes (Attorney General), 
—Likely utilization of recombinant W.K research findings by other countries 
for germ warfare applications (Central Intelligence Agency), 
—Potential effects on the economy of new diseases in humans, animals or crops 
(Council of Economic Advisers), 
—Effects of such diseases vis-a-vis the food supply (Department of Agriculture) 
— Exportability/salability of potentially biocontaminated goods (Department of 
Commerce), 
—Extent of Jeopardj'- to national defense implicit in granting epidemic power 
to unsupervised (possibly self-immunized) private researchers (Department of Defense) 
—Need for public insurance programs and stockpiled mass Immunization capabil- 
ities (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare), 
— Possible dangers to forests, rangeland, wildlife, and fisheries (Department 
of the Interior), 
— Coiontermeastires against exploitation of hazardous recombinant microorganisms 
by extortionists, organized criminals, and terrorists (Department of JusticeK 
—Regulations necessary to protect the occupational health of laboratory workers 
with such materials (Department of Labor National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health), 
—Diplomatic initiatives necessary to achieve suitable international agreements 
for conduct of recombinant DNA work (de«ned "essential" in the Guidelines, p, 27905) 
(Department of State), 
—Adequacy of packaging, labeling, and shipping requirements against accidental 
breakage and theft of recombinant materials (Department of Transportation Office of 
Hazardous Materials Operations), 
—Need for additional epidemiological emergency planning at federal, state, 
and local levels (General Services Administration Federal Preparedness Agency), 
—Likely effects on tax revenues from successes in recombinant E.’A commercial- 
ization (Internal Revenue Service); likely effects on government expenditures from 
escaped recombinant organisms (Bureau of the Budget), 
—Assessment of the Guidelines' physical containment recommendations in light 
of past experience with radioactive materials (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 
The possibilities for deliberate misuse of recombinant ENA techniques deserve 
especially careful consideration. In the nuclear field, we have seen how early 
complacency gave way to mounting concern as the problems of theft, sabotage and 
Appendix K — 174 
