- u - 
terrorism ramified in complexity and difficulty. Because of the relative ease 
and low cost of gene implantation methods, the dangers of illicit e:r,l;itation 
may prove even less tractable in this field. We have it on good aut'.rritv that 
a recombinant laboratory could construct, without a great deal of difficulty, 
a strain^of_the omnipresent bacterium Escherichia coli which prciuces bot^linus 
toxin, 5, 6 In relation to the obvious rejoinder regaraing endangerr.ent of self 
and others, we note that this issue does not pertain exclusively to scientists, 
but to anyone who can obtain the wherewithal to carrj’’ out such a procec’ire— or 
to instruct an uninformed or unstable person to do it. The mental stability of 
scientists themselves, while high, is not absolute,' 
Dramatic inconsistencies are evident with regard to the question of misuse. 
The Guidelines list six classes of experiments deemed too hazardous to perform 
at present even in the best containment available (pp, 2791i;-279l5). Only one 
experiment, which will consume 8 to 12 months, is planned to begin to assess 
these biohazards standards and others Implicit throughout the Guidelines (this 
experiment, by V/allace ?. Rowe and Malcolm Martin of NIH, will utilize maximum 
(Pl;) containment to attempt to induce polyoma cancers in mice with genes implanted 
in E, coli ). Yet at the very same time, it is perfectly legal for any researcher 
to combine, multiply, and release to the environment the most deadly microbes 
imaginable. It must be borne in mind — against the force of one's natural incred- 
ulity — that the Guidelines are not regulations, are not proposed as future regula- 
tions, have no force of law over anybody, and have financial suasive power only 
over NIH grantees and applicants. 
The draft EIS states no anticipated research program which might establish a 
scientific basis for safety standards. Indeed, if we can believe the Guidelines' 
list of proscribed experiments, such a program would be unconscionably hazardous 
to undertake. It is fair to say that the prospective harm from recombinant TJJA 
work is so great that it is too risky even to attempt research which could ascer- 
tain the risks . It is like having a new type of' atonic bomb which cannot be tested 
for fear of igniting the Earth's atmosphere. Perhaps there is significant danger 
even in saying this. 
^ee, for example, Michael Flood's comprehensively documented review of illegal 
acts involving the nuclear power industry, "Nuclear Sabotage" ( Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists. October 1976, pp, 29-36), 
^Liebe F, Cavalieri, "New Strains of Life~or Death" ( New York Times Magazine . 
August 22, 1976), A professor of biochemistry at Cornell Medical School, 
Dr, Cavalieri claims 25 years' experience in molecular biology research, 
Robert L. Sinsheimer, Chairman, Division of Biology, California Institute of 
Technology, in letter to Donald S, Fredrickson, Director, National Institutes 
of Health, May 3, 1976, 
'^The case of Los Alamos physicist Louis Slotin is cautionary. On May 21, 19U6, 
Slotin fatally overexposed himself with radiation in a nuclear-bomb criticality 
test procedure he had previously conducted successfully forty times. He had been 
repeatedly warned to do the operation in a safer way, and had watched a colleague 
die from a similar overexposure earlier. Six other men were in the same room to 
observe Slotin when the accident occurred. See Roger Rapoport, The Great American 
Bomb Machine. New York; Ballantine, 1971, pp, 125-127, 
Appendix K — 175 
