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have in an alternative or compensating legal tender a more 
steady representative, quantitatively, of the real standard of 
value, labour, than in a mono-legal tender. 
In the case of the precious metals, however, we have seen 
that there is no danger of a lowering of their exchange value 
in terms of labour. The operation of the alternative or 
compensating principle, therefore, would simply be to check 
appreciation. The proposal of the bi-metallists is not to 
erect two standards ; the standard remains — labour. N either 
is it to give an artificial value to the cheaper of the two 
metals. Their proposal amounts simply to the provision of 
two legal tenders, a given quantity of each of which shall be 
taken to represent a given figure of account. These legal 
tenders would be susceptible of alternate use strictly in 
accordance with the natural economic laws enunciated by 
Adam Smith. That is, payment would always be made in 
that legal tender which represented the least quantity of 
labour given in exchange for the thing purchased, and as its 
value as a commodity would never be depreciated in terms 
of labour, the tender used would always be the nearest exact 
expression of the real standard of value — labour. 
In writing on this subject eight years ago, I said that the 
object of the bi-metallic proposal was not to enhance the 
exchange value of silver in terms of commodities generally, 
or labour ; but to tie down the exchange value of gold. 
Other things being equal, gold will always be the preferable 
legal tender because its smaller bulk will make it the most 
economical currency. We have seen that the exchange 
value of gold can only be enhanced by an increase in the 
demand for it as legal tender. The proposal of the 
bi-metallists is, therefore, simply that whenever in conse- 
quence of this arbitrary infiuence a given quantity of gold 
tends to represent more than a given quantity of labour, the 
variation shall be automatically checked by the use of the 
