T A C 
T A C 
7u4 
<d; cor. six-petalled, inserted into theca 1 .; 
stigma stellate ; berry dry, hexangular, &c. 
Tnere is one species, a herb of the East 
Indies. 
T ACHY G R APII\ , the art of writing 
fast o of short hand; of which authors have 
invent d several methods. See Stenogra- 
phy. 
TACK, in a ship, a great rope having a 
wale-knot at one end, which is seized or fast- 
ened into the clew of the sail ; so is reefed 
first through the chess-trees, and then is 
brought through a hole in the ship’s side. 
Its use is to carry forward the clew of the 
sail, and to make it stand close by a wind: 
and whenever the sails are thus trimmed, the 
main-tack, the fore-tack, and mizen-tack, are 
brought close by the board, _ and haled as 
much forward on as they can be. 
Tack-about, in the sea-language, is to 
turn the ship about, or bring her head about, 
£0 as to lie the contrary way. 
TACKLE, or Tackling, among seamen, 
denotes all the ropes or cordage of a ship, 
used in managing the sails, &c. In a more 
restrained sense, tackles are small ropes 
running in three parts, having at one end a 
pendant and a block ; and at the other end 
a block and a hook, to hang goods upon that 
are to be heaved into the ship or out of it. 
TACTICS, in the art of war, is the me- 
thod of disposing forces to the best advantage 
in order of battle, and of performing the se- 
veral military motions and evolutions. See 
W ar, art of. 
Tactics, in the military art, a word de- 
rived from the Greek, signifying order. Tac- 
tics consist of a knowledge of order, dispo- 
sition, and formation, according to the exi- 
gency of circumstances in warlike operations. 
General tactics are a combination or union 
of first orders, out of which others grow of a 
more extensive and complicated nature, to 
suit the particular kind of contest or battle 
which is to be given, or supported. Let it 
not, however, be inferred from this, that evo- 
lutions and tactics are one and the same. 
They are closely connected, but there is still 
a discernible difference between them. 
Tactics may be comprehended under order 
and disposition ; evolution is the movement 
which is made, and eventually leads to order. 
The higher branches of tactics should be 
thoroughly understood by all general officers; 
but it is sufficient for inferior officers and 
soldiers to be acquainted with evolutions. 
"Not that the latter are beneath the notice 
of general officers ; but that having already 
acquired a knowledge of them, they ought to 
direct their attention more immediately to 
the former, carefully retaining at the same 
time a clear apprehension of every species of 
military detail, and consequently obviating 
the many inconveniences and embarrass- 
ments which occur from orders being awk- 
wardly expressed by the general, and of 
course ill understood by the inferior officer. 
It may be laid down as a certain rule, that 
unless* a general officer makes himself ac- 
quainted with particular movements and dis- 
positions, and preserves the necessary recol- 
lections, it is morally impossible for him to 
be clear and correct in his general arrange- 
ments. Of all mechanical operations, found- 
ed upon given principles, the art of war is 
certainly the most compendious, the most 
enlarged, and the most capable of improve- 
ment, Almost every other science and art 
are comprehended in it ; and it should be the 
subject matter, the chief study, and the ul- 
timate object, of a general’s reflections. He 
must not be satisfied with a limited concep- 
tion of its various branches ; he should go 
deeply into ail its parts, be aware of its mani- 
fold changes, and know how to adapt move- 
ments and positions to circumstances and 
places. 
It will be of little use to a general to have 
formed vast projects, if, when they are to he 
executed, there should be a deficiency of 
ground ; if the general movements of the 
army should be embarrassed by the irregu- 
larity of some particular corps, by their over- 
lapping each other, &c. ; and if, through the 
tardiness of a manoeuvre, an enemy should 
have time to render his plan abortive by a 
more prompt evolution. A good general 
must be aware of all these contingencies, bv 
making himself thoroughly master of tactics. 
The Prussian tactics under Frederic the 
Great, had for their principal object to con- 
centrate forces, and to attack the chief points 
of an enemy, not at one and the same time, 
but one after another : whereas the tactics 
which have been uniformly pursued bv the 
French, since the commencement of their 
revolution, have been founded upon this prin- 
ciple; to attack all points with divided 
forces, at one and the same time. We thus 
see, that the principles of extension have 
been as much followed by the latter, as those 
of compression were studiously adhered to by 
the former. 
Tactics of Europe. The following obser- 
vations respecting the tactics of Europe, 
which we extract from a book entitled the 
Elementary Principles of Tactics, page 137, 
may not be uninteresting to our military 
readers: 
In the time of the Romans, the Gauls and 
other nations on the continent fought in the 
phalanx order ; it is this order which still pre- 
vails through ail Europe, except that it is 
deficient in tiie advantages and utility which 
Polybius ascribes to it, and is injured and 
disgraced by defects unknown to the antient 
phalanx. 
In Turenne’s days, troops were ranged 8 
deep, both in France and Germany. Thirty 
years after, in the time of Puysegur, the 
ranks were reduced to 5 ; in the last Flanders 
war to 4 ; and immediately after to 3 ; at pre- 
sent the ranks are reduced to 2. 
Tdiis part of the progression from eight to 
three being known, we easily conceive how 
the files of the phalanx have been diminished 
from sixteen to eight in the ages preceding 
Turenne. It is to be presumed, that this depth 
was considered as superfluous; and it was 
judged necessary to curtail it, in order to 
extend the front. However, the motion is 
of very little consequence, since we are now 
reduced to three ranks ; let u.s therefore en- 
deavour to find out what qualities of the pha- 
lanx have been preserved, and what might 
have been added to it. 
To shew that we have preserved the de- 
fects of the phalanx in Europe, we suppose 
two bodies of troops, one of eight thousand 
men, ranged as a phalanx, sixteen deep ; the 
other a regiment of three battalions, consist- 
ing only of fifteen hundred men, drawn up in 
three lines after the same manner. These 
two bodies shall be perfectly equal and alike 
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in extent of front, and shall differ in no 
thing but in the depth of their files ; the in 
conveniences and defects, therefore, occa 
sioned by tiie length of their fronts, are equa 
in botli troops, though their numbers ar 
very different; hence it follows, that in Eu 
rope, tiie essential defects of tiie phalanx ar 
preserved, and its advantages lost. 
Let the files of this body of eight thousant 
be afterwards divided, and let it be reduce! 
to three in depth, its front will then be foiiiu 
live times more extensive, and its depth l\vi 
times less; we may therefore conclude, tlisfl 
the defects of the phalanx are evidently mul 
tiplied in the discipline of Europe, at tiie es 
pence of its advantages, which consisted in 
(he depth of its tiles. 
The progress which has taken place in the 
artillery, has contributed greatly to this re; 
volution. As cannon multiplied", it was nl 
cessary to avoid its effects ; and the only 
method of avoiding, or at least of lessening 
them, was doubtless to diminish the dept* 
of the files. 
ddie musquet, likewise, lias a great shall 
in tiie alteration ; the half-pike was entirely 
laid aside for tiie bayonet ; and in order tc 
have no fire unemployed, it was thought nl 
cessary to put it in the power of every soluiei 
to make use of his. 
These are the two principal causes of til 
little solidity or depth given to our battl 
lions. 
We have now seen, that the defects of tiff 
phalanx were multiplied in the European dis- 
cipline, and its advantages and perfection! 
infinitely diminished. Our regulations arl 
therefore, much inferior to the phalanx, anl 
have nothing but the single effect of fire-ami 
lo counterbalance all its advantages. Til 
effect, however, of fire-arms, is an artificial 
power, and does not originally belong to th| 
manner of disciplining troops, the sole aim d 
which should be to employ man’s natural adf 
tion. It is man, therefore, and not this lirgl 
which is to be considered -as the principal 
agent ; and hence we may infer that thfl 
method is very much inferior to the phalanx] 
and still more to the Roman arrangement 
which so far surpassed that of Greece. 
The light troops of both these people wer 
much heavier than our battalions, and ha 
more power and solidity for a shock or con 
flict. However, the Roman discipline, noJ 
withstanding its superiority, is not calculate 
for our times ; because, as we are oblige 
to engage at a distance, ours, by its cannor 
would destroy the Grecian order of battle ij 
a very short time, and would be exposed to 
loss much less considerable itself, supposjn 
even the artillery was equal on both sicles 
we should then, in order to perfect our ai 
rangements, endeavour to procure them a 
the advantageous qualities of tiie legionar 
regulations, as the only means of giving thei 
the superiority. 
Many people are of opinion, that we imj 
fate the Romans, and that we give battle ac 
cording to their system, because our troop 
are drawn up in lines, some of which ar 
full, and others vacant. But it lias beej 
proved, that three battalions have the saml 
front, and the same inconveniences, thJ 
eight thousand men, ranged in the phaiaiij 
order. Our lines are formed by brigade* 
regiments, or battalions, and the distance g® 
one corps to the other is equal to the fronl 
