affairs. He accordingly instituted the navv- 
office, appointed commissioners, constructed 
several large ships, and laid the foundation of 
that naval power, which, in the time of his 
daughter, preserved the independance, and 
added not a little to the glory, of England. 
Nor were the French at this period inat- 
I tentive to their navy. During an engage- 
l ment with the English in the Channel, their 
! ileet appears to have assumed a regular and 
I systematical arrangement. It consisted of 
three divisions, that in the centre -being com- 
I posed of thirty-six ships, and the van and 
rear of thirty each. '1 he galleys, which had 
| come from the Mediterranean, were consi- 
dered in the same point of view as frigates 
I are at the present day, and never entered the 
line of battle. 
Meanwhile, the introduction of gunpowder 
had created an entire change in the weapons 
of war ; and at this day the sword and the 
boarding-pike are perhaps the only ones that 
have been used in common, both by the an- 
tients and moderns. The Spaniards, who 
had become a great maritime narion, are 
said to have been the first who had recourse 
to cannon, during a sea-fight with the English 
and their allies, oif Rochelle, in 1372 : yet it 
has been asserted, that this instrument of de- 
struction was actually recurred to by our 
ancestors in 1350. The same people soon 
after threatened an invasion, by means of an 
armada, which, whether we consider the size 
of the vessels, or the manner in which they 
cvere manned and equipped, must be consi- 
dered as truly formidable. They entered 
the Channel in the form of a crescent, the 
horns of which extended to a prodigious dis- 
tance, and were assuredly more than a match 
for any force that could be brought to op- 
pose them. But lord Howard of Effingham, 
assisted by Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher, 
(all of whom, but himself alone, had been 
bred in the merchant-service), so managed an 
inferior squadron, as to obtain a complete 
victory. 
A competent idea may be formed of the- 
fleet oi England in those days, by observing, 
that on the demise of Elizabeth, it consisted 
of forty small ships only, of which number 
four did not exceed forty guns, and but two 
of these were of the burthen ol a thousand 
tons; twenty-three others were below- live 
hundred ; of the rest, some did not exceed 
fifty, and some not even twenty, while the 
whole number of guns amounted to no more 
than 774. 
But the long and bloody contest that after- 
wards took place with Holland for naval 
superiority, finally fixed the character of the 
English nation, in respect to maritime affairs. 
During three dreadful wars, there were no 
less than nineteen general engagements, in 
one of which the fight was renewed for three 
days in succession, in another for two days, 
and in a third for one ; making in all no less 
than twenty-five days of general actions. 
What is still more extraordinary, De Witt 
on one side, and Monk and Blake on the 
other, were landsmen, vet they all fought 
with unrivalled skill and intrepidity. The 
last of these was the first who ever brought 
ships of war to oppose castles. 
At die death of Charles II. the royal navy 
amounted in all to- 1 13 sail. James II. while 
a subject, had commanded a fleet, and insti- 
WAI1. 
tilled, or rather improved and enlarged, the 
system of signals. At his abdication, Eng- 
land possessed 173 vessels of different de- 
scriptions. During the time of William and 
Mary, these were increased to 25(3; but their 
success was not proportionable to the public 
expectation. In the reign of Anne, however, 
the naval power of France received a deadly 
blow at Vigo, having lost no leasthan seven- 
teen ships of war. 
On the accession of the house ot Bruns 
wick, the fleet increased rapidly ; and during 
the present reign, it has obtained an unex- 
ampled degree of prosperity: for towards the 
middle of the year 1306, it consisted ot 132 
sail of the line, 17 forty -four and fifty gun 
ships, 196 frigates, 106 sloops, &c. and 242 
gun-brigs, forming a total ot 753 in commis- 
sion. 
After these observations on the, rise and 
progress of the British navy, it may be neces- 
sary to make some remarks on the manner in 
which it is conducted during action, As the 
skill and bravery of our seamen have always 
been eminent by comparison in close engage- 
ments between single ships, it necessarily 
follows, that the adoption ot any system 
which would place fleets precisely in the 
same condition, could not fail to be attended 
with the most beneficial advantages. It was 
a long while, however, before this could be 
effected ; for the opposite squadrons being 
usually disposed in right lines parallel to each 
other, every ship keeping close hauled upon 
a wind on the same tack, it necessarily fol- 
lowed, that the action in general, provided 
equal numbers were brought into contact, 
could neither be long nor decisive. Thus it 
frequently happened, that nothing decisive 
occurred, not so much as a single ship being 
lost or won on either side. 
A great and sudden change was however 
effected. This occurred on the 12thol April 
1782; when admiral sir George Bridges llud- 
nev, instead of following the old system, 
pierced the French line, formed by the count 
De Grasse, and gained a complete victory. 
The same occurred under lord Howe, June 
1, 1794. 
A similar principle, viz. “ the directing the 
greater part of the force of a fleet against a 
few ships,’’ was put in practice by sir John 
Jervis, now earl St. Vincent, on the 13th ot 
February, 1797. 
At the battle of the Nile admiral sir Ho- 
ratio, afterwards lord viscount, Nelson, con- 
trived to double down on the enemy, and 
place part of their fleet between two fires : 
while during that of Trafalgar lie advanced 
in two lines, and effected a disjunction with 
similar effect, but by different means. The 
principle, indeed, was exactly the same in all; 
that of bringing fleets into the same position 
as single ships, so that the sailors might be 
enabled to fight hand to hand, with the addi- 
tional advantage, that the many would thus 
be enabled to attack the few. 
It has already been observed, that some of 
our gallant naval commanders, during the 
civil wars, had been bred in the army ; and 
it is not a little remarkable, that the great 
change which has taken place of late years, 
in respect to the management of fleets, ap- 
pears to have originated with a landsman, 
who, according to his own account, had at- 
tained ten years of age, before lie had ever 
seen a ship. The gentleman to whom we 
now allude is Mr. Clerk, 01 Eldin, author of 
an ‘‘Essay on Naval i actics, Systematical 
and Historical, in four parts.” The first edi- 
tion of the first part appeared in 1790, and the 
second edition in 1804; and as this is the 
only’ treatise of tiie kind in our language, we 
shall here take some notice ot it. 
During the American war, the action be- 
tween admiral Keppel and the French fleet, 
on the 27th of July, 1778, engaged Mr. 
Clerk’s particular attention. I he idea of the 
line of battle was in some parts novel, as it 
was an attack from the leeward; and he re- 
marked, with surprise, that in the course of 
the two long trials which followed this inde- 
cisive fight, as well as that ol admiral Mat- 
thews, in 1744, and of admiral Byng, in 1756, 
not a single hint escaped, “ that it was pos- 
sible any thing defective could be attributed 
to the system of the attack itself, or that any 
kind of improvement should be attempted ;” 
such as the scheme since put in practice,. 
“ the cutting the enemy’s line asunder; the 
directing the greater part of the force of a 
Heet against a few ships, either in the van or 
the rear, or even making a prize ot the slower- 
sailing or crippled ships of the enemy.” 
During the engagement of admiral Byron 
off the island of Grenada, on July 6, 1779, 
the -attack, like those made by Matthews and 
Byng, was from the windward ; and from 
a consideration of all these- cases, Mr. Clerk 
became induced to think, that the want of 
success was not to be attributed either to any 
abatement in the spirit of the seamen, or any 
defect in the shipping, or sailing of the fleets, 
but solely to the unskilful manner in which 
the general attacks were conducted. 
Impressed with these ideas, lie mentioned 
his suspicions, in January 1780, to a friend ot. 
sir George Rodney, to whom he at the same 
time communicated his theories of attack- 
from both windward and leeward, and ex- 
plained his doctrine ot cutting the enemy’s* 
line. The propriety of these plans was not 
fully exemplified however, until two years 
after, (April 12, 1782;) when a victory, far 
more decisive and important than any which 
had been gained by our fleets du; ing the last 
century, was obtained ; for, on this occasion, 
the attack was from the leeward, which the 
‘author considers as more rare, ingenious, 
and effectual, than an attack from the wind- 
ward ; in addition to which, the enemy’s line 
was at the same time cut in two. 
In the Essay on Naval Tactics, the impro- 
priety of a single ship to windward bearing 
down directly on an enemy to leeward, is 
pointed out by a diagram, accompanied with 
a demonstration : we are then presented with 
a comparative estimate of the effect of shot 
directed against the rigging of a ship, with 
its result when employed against the hull. 
In respect to fleets, an attack from the wind- 
ward is supposed to be attended with a disad- 
vantage in the ratio of twenty to one, as the 
tire ot the whole line to leeward can be ap- 
plied, on such an occasion, against the van of 
the assailants; a manoeuvre which the 
French were well acquainted with, and put' 
constantly in practice, until the new mode of 
combat was introduced. 
These positions art- illustrated by, 
1. Admiral Matthews’ engagement with* 
the combined fiee*H of France and fepain, off. 
Toulon, February 11, .1744. 
