880 
WAR. 
2 ; ^' 1 } iral !? >’ n S’ s act ’ 1011 with tlie French will fall immediately into the power of their 
Jet off Minorca. Mav 20. 1756. pnpmipc 
fleet oil Minorca, May 20, 1756. 
3. Admiral Keppel’s off Ushant, July 27, 
1778. 
4. Admiral Byron’s off Grenada. July 6, 
1779. 
5. Admiral Barrington’s, at St. Lucia. 
6. Sir George Bridges Rodney’s, off Capes 
Finisterre and St. Vincent. 
7. G ff the 
Pearl Rock, Martinico, April 17, 1780. 
8. ■ to wind- 
ward of Martinico, May 15, 1780. 
9. near the 
same place, May 19, 1780. 
10. Admiral Arbuthnot’s, off the Che- 
sapeak, March 16, 1781. 
11. Sir Samuel Hood’s, off Fort Royal, 
Martinico, April 29, 1781. , 
12. Admiral Parker’s, oft the Dogsrer- 
bank, August 5, 1781. 
13. Commodore Johnstone’s, at Port 
Praya, in the island of St. Julian. 
14. Admiral Greaves’s, off the Chesapeak, 
Septembers, 1781. 
h rom the particulars of this catalogue, 
Mr. Clerk deduces, as a general principle, 
that “ where the British fleets being to wind- 
ward, have endeavoured, by extending their 
line ot battle, to stop, take, or destroy, the 
whole ot the ships of the enemy’s line to 
leeward, they have been disabled before 
they could reach a situation whence they 
couid annoy the enemy; and, on the other 
hand, the French pursuing the British, in 
disorder, unsupported, and disabled, have 
made sail; and after throwing in the whole 
lire upon the van of the British fleet, ship by 
ship, as passing in succession, have formed a 
line to leeward, so as to be prepared in case 
another attack could be made.” 
He concludes by observing, “ that the 
most artful management of sails, the closest 
approximation, or the most spirited canno- 
nade, will avail nothing, under such circum- 
stances; and that it is in vain to hope, that 
ever any thing material can be effected 
against an enemy’s fleet keeping to wind- 
ward, passing on contrary tacks, and desirous 
to go oil, unless his line of battle can be cut 
iii twain, or some such other step can be de- 
vised as has already been described.” 
Mr. Clerk, after this, proposes certain new 
modes, and points out their advantages : 
1. The attack from the windward upon the 
rear of the enemy. 
2. On the enemy’s three sternmost ships. 
Fie considers bot'h of these as far preferable 
to the attempt of getting up with the ene- 
my’s van, with the view to carry the whole 
fleet; and thinks that we ought rather to con- 
tent ourselves with- the certainty of cuttiim 
off a few of their dullest-sailing vessels. 
In Part II. we are presented with three 
cases of an attack: the 1st when made by 
the headmost ships of a squadron on the van 
of a retreating enemy ; the 2d on or near 
the centre ; and the 3rd upon the van, or 
any where ahead of the centre. 
After due investigation, Mr. Clerk is of 
opinion, that the attack from the leeward 
quarter can be executed with the greatest 
number of advantages, particularly "as the 
crippled ships remain under the protection 
•of their friends ; whereas, on the contrary 
those appertaining to a fleet to windward 
enemies. 
The battles which have taken place since 
the publication of this work, seem fully to 
justify all the positions laid down by this au- 
thor, whose merits are acknowledged, and 
who, we are informed, has received encou- 
ragement and protection of the highest kind. 
Of military arrangements. 
The art of arranging armies in order of 
battle, and of regulating their movements in 
such a manner, as may be deemed most pro- 
per lor attacking, defending, or retreating, 
to the greatest possible advantage, is termed 
military tactics. It has been generally re 
cognised, and is at length received as an 
axiom, that there is no branch ot human 
knowledge more difficult than that of which 
we are now about to treat; and both antients 
and moderns have been so well convinced of 
this fact, that it has been regularly taught in 
public schools, erected expressly for" that 
purpose. 
Two celebrated nations, the Greeks and 
the Romans, were particular! v anxious to 
attain perfection in the science of war; and 
this accounts, in some measure, for their ex- 
traordinary success, when combating against 
enemies who, content with a blind obedience 
to a custom, placed their chief confidence, 
not in the discipline, but in the multitude of 
then combatants, they, on the contrary 
were conscious that the strength of armies 
consists principally in the art with which they 
are managed, and the principles by which 
they are regulated; that multitudes are often 
more embarrassing than useful ; and that a 
small body of troops, well regulated, and 
ably directed, is capable of overcoming a 
laige one, deficient in respect to those ad- 
vantages. Thence too they deduced a theory 
i dative to the disposition of their soldiers 
the order of battle, the manner of encamping 
the best and most regular mode of marching 
ot forming, and of acting, in such a way as 
to oppose the strong to the weak, while they 
at the same time anticipated all the strata- 
gems, and prevented all the deceptions of 
the enemy. On the other hand, they did 
not forget to regulate the different species of 
aims, to attain address in managing; and 
to adopt the most advantageous method of 
using them, whether offensively or defen- 
sively. 
War, accordingly, was regarded as an art, 
of which it was necessary to become ac- 
quainted with the principles anterior to the 
practice. It is but little wonder, therefore, 
that so many great men were produced, and 
such wonderful effects ensured ; more espe- 
cially in Greece, where infinite pains were 
taken to attain a perfect system. The Ro- 
mans too directed their attention to military 
attans , and the order of the legion was sup- 
posed on the whole to be superior to that of 
the phalanx. Vegetius, indeed, after examin- 
ing its formation, exclaims, that none but a 
,°d could have contrived such a powerful and 
admirable assemblage. 
1 hat wonderful nation too, laying preju- 
dice aside at once examined, studied, and 
adopted, those practices in which they were 
excelled by their enemies. A defeat was 
never lost on them ; for after every reverse 
they obtained an increase of their military 
knowledge. Thus the sharp-edged weapons 
of the Gauls, and the elephants of Pyrrhus 
never surprised them but once; and they had 
no sooner become acquainted with the Spa- 
nish sword, than they immediately abandon 
their own. At the same time, they did not 
onnt to employ Numidian horses, Cretan 
archers, slmgers from the Balearic islands 
and ships belonging to Rhodes. In fine, no’ 
people ever exhibited so much prudence in 
their preparations for a campaign, or carried 
on hostilities with such extraordinary auda- 
city. We are the less inclined to wonder, 
therefore, at the observation of Josephus 
who remarks, “that war with them was a 
; meditation, and peace an exercise.” 
We accordingly find that they abound with 
great commanders ; and what is still more 
extraordinary, that many of these command- 
ers proved victorious without the benefit 
of experience. Scipio, at the age of twebtv- 
reven knew how to repair the faults com- 
mitted by Ins father and his uncle, in con- 
sequence of previous study. When Lucul- 
lus marched into Asia for the purpose of at- 
tacking Mithndates, he instructed himself, ac- 
cording to Cicero, by reading Xenophon, 
and the best authors; while at a later period 
i\aises, who had never before commanded, 
nor even served, replaced Belisarius, over- 
came lotila, and successfully concluded the 
struggle with the Goths. 
It is evident, therefore, that war is to be 
regulated according to certain rules and prin- 
ciples; and that on the knowledge and ap- 
plication of these, depends the fate of a cam- 
paign a nd perhaps of a nation. It necessa- 
ill) follows, that a general ought to possess 
extraordinary talents and attainments. Ac- 
cording to a celebrated author, “some qua- 
lities should be born with, and others acquired 
by, him. In addition to these, he should 
also possess a quick eye, so as to enable him 
judge of an advantageous position for his 
hoops, decide on a manoeuvre to be made 
°r to be avoided, of a country suitable or 
unsuitable to his army; and, above all, of a 
held of battle whence he can derive the 
greatest number of possible advantages at 
the least possible risk or inconvenience. 
He should at the same time exhibit a sound 
and solid judgment; for the choice of officers 
to be employed on any particular exigency, 
depends in a great measure upon him, and 
therefore the best dispositions would prove 
irurtless it not ably seconded. As his orders 
too cannot, from the nature of things be 
precise, it is expected therefore of those" who 
command under him, to know how to take 
advantage of a wrong movement on the part 
ot the enemy, to commence an attack them- 
selves, or only to sustain the troops engaged 
and to vary their conduct according to the 
vaij ing nature of circumstances. 
But these qualities in the chief without 
siiboidination on the part of those who are 
reibject to his command would be of little 
avail, if order and discipline were not duly 
observed Without these, the most nunm- 
rous and best -composed army would soon be- 
come little better than a horde of Tartars 
who, being muted only by the hope of booth 
separate as soon as that motive ceases to 
opeiate. Great art is necessary, however 
in enforcing discipline, and a happy mean 
ought to be adopted. Too mucli seveSy 
disgusts the soldier, and not unfrequeutly 
