656 
ving, and dry-pointing, as is thought neces- 
sary, the plate is worked up to the full effect 
intended; and it is then sent to the writing- 
engraver, to grave whatever letters may be 
required to be put upon it. 
Etching on glass . — Glass resists the action 
of all the acids, except the fluoric acid. By 
this, however, it is corroded in the same 
manner as copper is by aquafortis; and 
plates of glass may be engraven in the same 
manner as copper. 
I here are several methods of performing 
this.. e shall first describe the mode of 
etching by means of the fluoric acid in the 
state of gas. Having covered over the glass 
to be etched with a thin coat of virgin-wax 
(which is only common bee’s-wax bleached 
white), draw the design upon it in the same 
manner as in etching on copper. Then take 
some fluor spar, commonly called Derby- 
shire spar, pound it line, and put it into a 
leaden vessel, pouring some sulphuric acid 
over it. Place the glass with the etched side 
lowermost over this vessel, two or three in- 
ches above it. Apply a gentle heat to the 
leaden vessel ; this will cause the acid to act 
opon the fluor spar, and disengage the gas, 
which will corrode the glass. When it is suf- 
ficiently corroded, remove the wax by oil of 
tu rpentine. 
This etching may be also performed by 
raising a margin of bordering-wax all round 
the glass, in the same manner as on copper, 
and pouring on the liquid fluoric acid, which 
acts upon the glass. The method of making 
this acid is described under Fluoric acid, 
and in the article Chemistry. 
A thiid method of etching on glass is as 
follows: Having put the wax on the glass, 
draw your design, and raise a margin all 
round it. Then put pounded fluor spar, with 
some sulphuric acid diluted with water, upon 
the glass. The sulphuric acid will disengage 
the fluoric, which will be absorbed by 3 the 
water, and corrode the glass. 
ETHICS, or Morality, the science of 
manners or duty, which it traces from man’s 
nature and condition, and shews to terminate 
in his happiness ; or, in other words, it is the 
knowledge of our duty and felicity, or the 
art of being virtuous and happy. 
Moral philosophy inquires, not bowman 
might have been, but how 7 he is constituted ; 
not into what principles or dispositions his 
actions may be artfully resolved, but from 
what principles and dispositions they actually 
rose ; not what he may, by education, habit, 
or foreign influence, come to be or do, but 
•what by his nature or original frame, he is 
framed to be and do. From a view, there- 
fore, of man’s-' faculties, appetites, and pas- 
sions, it appears, that the -health and perfec- 
tion of man must be in the supremacy of con- 
science and reason, and in the subordination 
of the passions and affections to their autho- 
rity and direction; and his virtue or good- 
ness must consist in acting agreeably to this 
order and economy. 
It is true, some eminent philosophers have 
attempted to lay the foundation of morals 
much deeper, viz. in the nature and reason, the 
truth and fltness of things. Senses and affec- 
tions, they tell us, are vague and precarious ; 
and though they were not, yet are irrational 
principles of action, and consequently very im- 
proper foundations, on which to rest the eter*- 
iral and immutable obligations of morality. 
ETHICS. 
Hence they talk much of the abstract nature 
and reason ot things, of eternal differences, 
unalterable relations, fitnesses and unfitnesses 
resulting from those relations; and from these 
eternal reasons, differences, relations, and 
their consequent fitnesses, they suppose mo- 
ral obligation to arise. A conduct agreeable 
to them, or, in other words, to truth, they 
call virtue; and the reverse, vice. But the 
truth is, that we might perceive all the pos- 
sible relations, differences, and reasons of 
things, and yet be wholly indifferent to this 
or that conduct, unless we were endued with 
some sense or affection by which we approved 
and loved the one, and "disapproved and dis- 
liked the other conduct. Reason may perceive 
a fitness to a certain end ; but without some 
sense or affection we cannot propose or in- 
deed have any idea of an end or motive; 
and, without an end, we cannot conceive any 
inducement to action. Therefore, before we 
can understand the natures, reasons, and fit- 
nesses ot tilings, which are said to be the foun- 
dation ot morals, we must know what natures 
are meant, to what ends they are fitted, and 
from what principles or affections they are 
prompted to act ; otherwise we cannot judge 
of the duty required, or of the conduct be- 
coming that being whom we suppose under 
moral obligation. But let the natures be 
once given, and the relations which subsist 
among them be ascertained, we can then de- 
termine what conduct will be obligatory to 
such natures, and adapted to their condition 
and economy. And to the same natures, 
placed in the same relations, the same con- 
duct will he eternally and invariably proper 
and obligatory. 
Besides, to call morality a conformity to 
truth, gives no idea, no characteristic of it, 
but what seems equally applicable to vice. 
For whatever propositions are predicable of 
virtue (as, that it Hows from good affections, 
or is agreeable to the order of our nature, 
tends to produce happiness, is beheld with 
approbation, &c.) ; the contrary propositions 
are equally true, and may be equally pre- 
dicated, of vice. * J 1 
Another set of philosophers establish mo- 
rals upon a better foundation, the will or po- 
sitive appointment of the Deity, and call vir- 
tue a conformity to that will or appointment. 
All obligation, they say, supposes one who 
obliges, or who has a right to prescribe, and 
can reward the obedient, and punish the dis- 
obedient. This can be none but the Crea- 
tor. His will, therefore, is our law, which 
we are bound to obey. And this, they tell 
us, is alone sufficient "to bind or oblige such 
imperfect and corrupt creatures as we are, 
who are but feebly moved with a sense of 
the beauty and excellence of virtue, and 
strongly swayed by passion or views of inte- 
-rest. 
.This scheme of morality entirely coincides 
with that deduced from our inward structure 
and condition, since these are the effects of 
the divine will. Whatever, therefore, is 
agreeable or correspondent to our inward 
structure, must likewise be agreeable, or cor- 
respond to the will of God. So that all the 
indications or sanctions of our duty, which 
are declared or enforced by our structure, 
are, and may be, considered as indications 
or sanctions of the will of our Creator. If 
these indications, through inattention to, or 
abuse of, our structure, prove insufficient to 
declare; or if these sanctions, through the 
weakness or wickedness of men, prove°insuf- 
licient to enforce obedience to the divine will, 
and the Deity is pleased to add new indica- 
tions or new sanctions ; these additional indi- 
cations and sanctions cannot, and are not 
supposed by the assertors of this scheme, to 
add any new duty or new moral obligation ; 
but only a new and purer promulgation of 
our duty, or a new and stronger sanction or 
motive from interest to perform that duty, and 
to fulfil that obligation to which we were bound 
belore. It makes no difference as to the mat- 
ter of obligation, after what manner the will 
of our Creator is enforced or declared to us, 
whether by word or writ, or by certain in- 
ward notices and determinations of our own 
minds, arising according to a necessary law 
ot our nature. Again, if the scheme of duty, 
as deduced from moral perceptions, and the 
affections of our nature, is thought too slight 
a foundation on which to rest morality, be- 
cause these are found insufficient to bind or 
rather to compel men to their duty, we fear 
the same objection will militate against the 
scheme of conformity to the divine will, since 
ail the declarations and sanctions ofit have not 
hitherto had tiieir due effect, in producing a 
thorough and universal reformation. 
When some speak k of the will of God as 
the rule of duty, they do not certainly mean 
a blind, arbitrary principle of action, but 
such a principle as is directed by reason and 
governed by wisdom, or 3 regard to certain 
ends in preference to others : for unless we 
suppose some principle in tiie Deity analo- 
gous to our sense of obligation, some antece- 
dent affection or determination of his nature 
to prefer some ends before others, we cannot 
assign any sufficient reason why he should 
will one thing more than another. What- 
ever, therefore, is the ground of his choice or 
will, must be the ground of obligation, and 
not the choice or will itself. That this is the 
case, appears farther from the common dis- 
tinction which divines and philosophers make 
between moral and positive commands and 
duties. I he former they think obligatory 
antecedent to will, or at least to any decla- 
ration of it; the latter, obligatory 7 only in 
consequence of a positive appointment of the 
divine will. But what foundation can there 
be for tins distinction, if all duty and obliga- 
tion is equally the result of mere will ? 
Whatever may have been the reasoning of 
heathen philosophers on this subject (and" to 
which, indeed, this article chiefly refers), the 
professors of Christianity have no difficulty in 
understanding what is the will ©f God, and 
consequently what are the true principles of 
moral duty. That these were not understood 
bv the wisest of the heathens, is evident from 
theii practice, and still more so from even 
their speculative, their cool, deliberate, and 
well digested reasonings. (See Gregory’* 
Essays Historical and Moral; Essay on the 
Principles of Morals.) But Christians are 
furnished not only with the strongest motives 
but with the most clear and decisive precepts 
for the performance of their duty. The ex- 
cellence of the gospel in this respect super- 
sedes the necessity of all human speculations- 
and hence nothing can be more idle or frfft- 
less than to search for moral instructions in 
the writings of the heathens. Nor can any- 
thing be more a work of supererogation to 
men who' have the Bible in tiieir hands, tl w h 
