Foreword 
In response to the emerging scientific evidence that cigarette smoking 
posed a significant health risk to the user, in the early 1950's the major 
cigarette manufacturers began widespread promotion of filtered cigarettes 
to reassure smokers that, regardless of whatever unhealthy constituents 
were in cigarette smoke, filters were a "scientific" breakthrough. 
Advertisements for Viceroy's "health guard filter" stated, "DENTISTS 
ADVISE — Smoke VICEROYS — ^The Nicotine and Tars Trapped by The Viceroy 
Filter CAN NEVER STAIN YOUR TEETH!" and "Leading N.Y. Doctor Tells 
His Patients What to Smoke — Filtered Cigarette Smoke Is Better For Health. 
The Nicotine and Tars Trapped . . . Cannot Reach Mouth, Throat Or Lungs." 
Chesterfield was "Best for you — low in nicotine, highest in quality," while 
L&M's were "Just What the Doctor Ordered." Lorillard Tobacco Company 
stressed its science-based Kent micronite filter (the original micronite filter 
was made of asbestos) and claimed it removed seven times more tar and 
nicotine than any other cigarette, which "put Kent in a class all by itself 
where health protection is concerned." Of course, we know today that not 
only were these claims patently false, but the cigarette companies knew it. 
In the early 1950's the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged a 
variety of health claims made for cigarettes in their advertising, including 
claims about tar and nicotine. In 1955 FTC published advertising guidelines 
that, among other things, prohibited claims by cigarette manufacturers 
that a particular brand of cigarettes was low in tar and nicotine or lower 
than other brands, when it had not been established by competent scientific 
proof that the claim was true and the difference was significant. Cigarette 
manufactures, however, continued to advertise tar numbers. In the absence 
of a standardized test methodology, this resulted in what is referred to as a 
"tar derby" — a multitude of inconsistent, noncomparable claims that did not 
give consumers a meaningful opportunity to assess the relative tar delivery 
of competing brands. The tar derby ended in 1960 when discussions with 
FTC culminated in an industry agreement to refrain from tar and nicotine 
advertising. 
In 1966, however, the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) prepared a 
technical report on "tar" and nicotine that concluded, "The preponderance 
of scientific evidence strongly suggests that the lower the 'tar' and nicotine 
content of cigarette smoke, the less harmful would be the effect." In reaching 
this conclusion, the report noted the clear relationship between dose of 
cigarette smoke received by the smoker and disease risk. Regardless of how 
dose was calculated — by number of cigarettes smoked per day, age of 
initiation, total number of years one smoked, or depth of inhalation, 
mortality rates among smokers increased. When smokers quit smoking, 
their risk was reduced in proportion to the length of time off cigarettes. 
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