5 
paper contains a remarkable example of the 
application of the notion of final causes, and 
merits an attention which other matters have 
hitherto prevented me from bestowing upon 
it. I hope, ere long, to recur to this paper, 
which is the expansion of an instructive remark 
made by Mr. Diggles at one of your meetings. 
As to our society itself, I hope that each year 
will see it approaching more nearly those pro- 
portions which a similar body has attained in 
a sister colony (Victoria). If all the aspira- 
tions of dwellers in this part of the world are 
not to be limited to that material prosperity 
which, exclusively aimed at, leads to moral 
degeneracy and national decay, the impor- 
tance of such an institution as this can scarcely 
be overstated. In a country where but little 
exists to remind us of those halls and schools 
in which learning and science are cherished at 
home, it surely is no slight matter to have 
organised a meeting, in which lovers of 
science can exchange their ideas, expound 
their views, and knit more firmly their 
social ties, and to which they can com- 
municate their researches ; researches which, 
if I am not mistaken, may one day be 
found to have a more than local interest. 
However ambitious the name which we 
have assumed may seem to some, there are 
those among us who will strive to render our 
society worthy of its name. It seeks not 
merely to receive, to read, and to register the 
communications, however interesting, of its 
members, but it a 1 so seeks, by discussion, to 
further the ends of research, and, more than 
that, to give to research a tone and direc- 
tion. For myself, I am of those who 
would wish to see the society embrace 
the largest possible field of topics and 
enquiry. And regarding, as I do, philosophy 
and history as the two lakes in which, however 
turbid in their course, the waters of science at 
length rest clear and tranquil, I ventured, in 
my first annual address, to advert to the sub- 
ject of scientific history. For the most part, 
and us a general rule, the man of observation 
should also be a man of reading ; otherwise 
his powers of observation may be directed to 
that which, however interesting to himself, has 
been observed by others over and over again. 
The same powers employed in another direc- 
tion, might lead to results of permanent and 
wide-spread value. Nothing is more to be 
wished than that the philosophical and histori- 
cal devotees of science should bear in mind 
the words which Thibaut addressed to the 
corresponding devotees of law : — c< Without 
philosophy there is no complete history ; 
without history no safe application of philo- 
sophy. Both must unite as aids to interpreta- 
tion, and must exercise a continual influence on 
each other. The jurist who aspires after perfec- 
tion will therefore endeavor to combine prof ound 
historical knowledge with philosophical views ; 
for the historical part of jurisprudence can 
never be separated by a sharp line from the 
philosophical. In each are gaps which can* 
only be filled up by the aid of the other.” 
These remarks are not applicable to law only. 
Perhaps many a dull school-book might, by a 
little infusion of historical information, so be 
vivified into an interesting manual. It is only 
in the infancy of societies, as in the infancy of 
individuals, that any great amount of leisure 
is in general afforded for abstract speculation 
on matters not directly or immediately con- 
nected with the practical work of their exist- 
ence ; and as we at the present moment do not 
lack the leisure, I avail myself of it to take a 
rapid glance at that tree of science of which 
the society, by its very title, proclaims itself 
the fosterer. Even were we to regard science 
and art as envious rivals, and not as allies 
interlaced by a thousand ties, the task of de- 
fining each would not be easy. It is not my 
object here to draw a distinct line between 
them, but rather to point out how dim and 
shadowy is their common boundary. The 
subject matter of a study is not in itself suf- 
ficient for enabling us to decide beyond dis- 
pute whether we are considering an art or a 
science. Thus, by way of example, the subject 
of contemplation may be number. But we 
may consider number under such an aspect as, 
on the one hand, to evolve a science of number 
or a theory of numbers, or, on the other hand, 
to deduce practical rules which form, pro- 
perly speaking, portions of an art 
of computation, or of an art or 
method of bookkeeping, &c. Again, space 
or some of the conceptions arising out of it, 
underlie at once the science of space, i.e., 
geometry, and the arts of surveying, of mensu- 
ration, &c. Logic, so far as it analyses the 
processes of the mind in reasoning, is a science j 
so far as it furnishes us with practical rules to 
secure the mind from error in its deductions, 
an art. And, so far as it combines itself, in its 
exercise, with rhetoric, it partakes still more 
closely of the character of an art. The subject- 
matter then, alone, is not the test of art or 
science. We must take into consideration the 
final cause, end, or object in view. When 
such end in view is the manufacture or pro- 
duction of some material object, or some 
mechanical result, or some emotional state, we 
aro in the field of what are called the mechanical 
arts, or the fine arts, according as their 
office is to minister to necessity or con- 
venience, or to gratify taste aud feeling. 
I find that Professor Cayley has recently said 
that algebra is an art and a science ; qua art it 
defines and prescribes operations, and qua 
science it affirms a priori, or predicts the 
results of operations. This of Mr. Cayley’s is 
one view of the meaning which in strictness 
the terms art and science should respectively 
bear. There is another, not perhaps essentially 
different, in which science and art may be 
likened respectively to theory and practice. 
